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VICARIOUS AGGRAVATORS 
Sam Kamin∗ & Justin Marceau∗∗ 
Abstract 
In Gregg v. Georgia, the Supreme Court held that the death penalty was 
constitutional so long as it provided a non-arbitrary statutory mechanism 
for determining who are the worst of the worst, and therefore, deserving of 
the death penalty. As a general matter, this process of narrowing the class 
of death eligible offenders is done through the codification of aggravating 
factors. If the jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt that one or more 
aggravating factors exists, then a defendant convicted of murder is eligible 
for the ultimate sentence. There is, however, a critical, unanswered, and 
under-theorized issue raised by the use of aggravating factors to serve this 
constitutionally mandated filtering function. Can death eligibility be 
predicated on vicarious aggravating factor liability—is there vicarious 
death penalty liability? 
A pair of cases, collectively known as the Supreme Court’s 
Enmund/Tison doctrine, recognize that there is no per se bar on the 
imposition of the death penalty for non-killing accomplices. But these 
cases considered only felony murder liability and did not address the 
question of whether a non-killer can be rendered death eligible on the basis 
of vicariously imposed aggravating factors. Presently, many state statutes 
allow aggravating factors to be proven vicariously (or are silent on the 
question); under such a rule, the existence or absence of one or more 
aggravating factors will often bear little relation to the defendant’s 
individual culpability. Because a defendant can be made eligible for capital 
murder through his participation in the crime with others—he is liable for 
murder as an accomplice, under a theory of co-conspirator or Pinkerton 
liability, or felony murder—in many cases we can have little confidence 
that a statute’s aggravating factors are serving their constitutional function 
of rationally determining who will live and who will die. This article is the 
first to identify this constitutional problem and to provide a framework for 
resolving it. After parsing a variety of capital sentencing statutes we 
propose a framework for determining the legislative intent behind an 
aggravating factor and for ensuring a sufficient level of culpability before a 
non-killing defendant may be sentenced to death. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of a death sentence 
without heightened procedural protections designed to limit and guide the 
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sentencer’s discretion.1 Consequently, in every death-penalty jurisdiction in 
the United States,2 the sentencer’s discretion to impose the ultimate 
punishment is limited by a requirement that a jury determine whether 
certain eligibility factors are present before a death sentence can be 
imposed. As a general rule, this process of guiding jury discretion is 
achieved through the use of statutorily enumerated aggravating factors.3 
Aggravating factors, then, serve the constitutionally mandated goal of 
separating the worst of the worst (those eligible for death) from the merely 
very bad. Aggravating factors do this by creating categories of crimes and 
killers that are inherently worse—and therefore more deserving of society’s 
condemnation—than others.  
There is, however, a critical, unanswered, and under-theorized issue 
raised by the use of aggravating factors to serve this constitutionally 
                                                                                                                     
 1. See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 874 (1983) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 
189 (1976)) (“A fair statement of the consensus expressed by the Court in Furman is that ‘where 
discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the determination of whether a 
human life should be taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to 
minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action.’”). There is a robust academic literature 
documenting and examining the requirement of guided discretion in the context of capital 
sentencing.  See, e.g., Justin F. Marceau, Lifting the Haze of Baze: Lethal Injection, the Eighth 
Amendment, and Plurality Opinions, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 159, 179 nn.88–89 (2009) (compiling 
academic and judicial support for the requirement, more generally, of heightened procedural 
protections in death penalty cases); Margaret Jane Radin, Cruel Punishment and Respect for 
Persons: Super Due Process for Death, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1143, 1143 (1980); Scott E. Sundby, 
The Lockett Paradox: Reconciling Guided Discretion and Unguided Mitigation in Capital 
Sentencing, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1147, 1148 (1991) (“The first commandment of ‘guided discretion’ 
requires that the sentencer’s discretion be narrowly guided as to which circumstances subject a 
defendant to the imposition of the death penalty.”).  
 2. Currently, thirty-six states and the federal government permit the imposition of a death 
sentence. See Death Penalty Facts, AMNESTY INT'L USA 1 (May 2012), http://www.amnestyusa.org/ 
pdfs/DeathPenaltyFactsMay2012.pdf.   
 3. See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-49 (2012); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-751(F) (2012); ARK. 
CODE ANN. § 5-4-604 (2012); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a) (West 2008); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-
1.3-1201(5) (2012); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-46a(i) (West Supp. 2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
11, § 4209(e) (2007); FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5) (2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30(b) (2012); 
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2515(9) (2012); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1(b) (West Supp. 2012); 
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(b) (LexisNexis 2009); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6624 (2011); KY. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 532.025(2)(a) (West 2012); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.4(A) (Supp. 2012); 
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-303(g)(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 99-19-
101(5) (2012); MO. REV. STAT. § 565.032(2) (2012); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-303 (2011); NEB. 
REV. STAT. § 29-2523(1) (2008); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.033 (LexisNexis 2012); N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 630:5(VII) (2012); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-5 (LexisNexis 2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§ 15A-2000(e) (2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(A) (LexisNexis 2010); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21 
§ 701.12 (Supp. 2012); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.150(1)(b) (2011); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(d) 
(West 2007); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C)(a) (2011); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-1 (2012); 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(i) (2012); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03 (West 2011); UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 76-5-202(1)–(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.2 (2012); WASH. 
REV. CODE § 10.95.020 (2012); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-102(h) (2011). 
3
Kamin and Marceau: Vicarious Aggravators
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013
772 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65 
 
mandated function. Because many state statutes allow aggravating factors 
to be proven vicariously4 (or are silent on the question), it is possible that 
the existence or absence of one or more aggravating factors will bear little 
relation to the defendant’s actual culpability. Where a defendant is made 
eligible for capital murder because of his participation in a crime with 
others—where he is liable for murder as an accomplice; under a theory of 
coconspirator, Pinkerton liability; or felony murder—we can have little 
confidence that a statute’s aggravating factors are rationally determining 
who is most culpable, and therefore, who will live and who will die. 
“Vicarious liability” has long been controversial in the criminal law 
generally.5 A foundational concern goes to the propriety of holding one 
person criminally accountable for the actions of another.6 In the death-
penalty context, a further concern arises regarding the fact that non-killers, 
even those who never intended that a death occur, may constitutionally be 
put to death because of the actions of others.7 We are concerned here, 
however, with a third level of attenuation between culpability and 
punishment—that is, we note the additional problems caused when a 
defendant can be made eligible for the death penalty based on 
characteristics that may have little or nothing to do with either his acts or 
his mental state. Stated another way, this Article illustrates the problems 
inherent in a three-tiered system of vicarious death-penalty eligibility: 
(1) imputing criminal liability to a defendant for acts of another (under 
vicarious liability theories); (2) establishing a non-killer’s sufficient 
culpability for the death penalty (under the Supreme Court’s Enmund–
Tison doctrine8); and (3) imputing the existence of a death-qualifying 
                                                                                                                     
 4. This Article uses the term vicarious liability in a slightly casual way. In reality, 
coconspirator liability and felony murder are theories of vicarious liability—the defendant is strictly 
liable for the actions of others because he has voluntarily associated himself with them. By contrast, 
accomplice or aiding-and-abetting liability is a theory of derivative liability—because the 
accomplice has encouraged the criminal misconduct, his liability derives from the principals.  This 
Article uses the term vicarious liability throughout to refer to all situations where one defendant is 
made liable for the conduct of another. 
 5. See, e.g., Audrey Rogers, Accomplice Liability for Unintentional Crimes: Remaining 
Within the Constraints of Intent, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1351, 1360 n.30 (1998) (acknowledging the 
controversy that “swirls around” complicity and conspiracy liability for the unintended crimes of 
the principal); Joshua Dressler, Reassessing the Theoretical Underpinnings of Accomplice Liability: 
New Solutions to an Old Problem, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 91, 110 n.107 (1985) (“Especially in cases of 
conspiracy, the result can be ‘vicarious criminal responsibility as broad as, or broader than, the 
vicarious civil liability . . . .’”); V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It 
Serve?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1477, 1482 n.26 (1996) (describing vicarious criminal liability as 
“controversial and unpopular”). 
 6. See, e.g., Joshua Dressler, Reforming Complicity Law: Trivial Assistance as a Lesser 
Offense?, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 427, 433 (2008) (summarizing the “troubling features of derivative 
liability”). 
 7. See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 
(1982). 
 8.  See Tison, 481 U.S. at 156–58; Enmund, 458 U.S. at 798, 801. 
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aggravating factor (as required by Furman9) under a theory of vicarious 
liability.  
Previous scholarship and judicial decisions have generally been silent 
on the question of vicarious aggravating-factor liability.10 Perhaps this is 
due to some prosecutors’ reluctance to seek the death penalty when they 
can only prove an aggravating factor through a theory of vicarious liability. 
However, it is certainly not the case that prosecutors never seek sentences 
of death on the basis of vicarious-aggravator liability. Many cases in which 
the death penalty is sought against a non-killer will involve vicarious 
liability.11 Indeed, the Supreme Court’s most famous case analyzing the 
constitutionality of a death sentence imposed on a non-killer, Tison v. 
Arizona,12 though decided on grounds other than vicarious liability, 
involved a death prosecution based in part on an aggravating factor whose 
vicarious applicationwas not challenged by defense counsel.13 Moreover, 
even if the practice of seeking death on a theory of vicarious-aggravator 
liability was rare, this would not be a question of merely academic interest. 
The Eighth Amendment requires that a jurisdiction’s capital sentencing 
                                                                                                                     
 9.  Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 874 (1983) (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 
(1972)). 
 10. Our research has not revealed a single article that addresses the question of whether and 
to what extent death-eligibility factors may be imputed to non-killers through theories of vicarious 
or derivative liability. To date, scholarship in this field has focused on the potential constitutional 
defects of executing a non-killer convicted exclusively on a felony murder theory. See, e.g., David 
McCord, State Death Sentencing for Felony Murder Accomplices Under the Enmund and Tison 
Standards, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 843, 843–45 (2000) [hereinafter State Death Sentence]; Richard A. 
Rosen, Felony Murder and the Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence of Death, 31 B.C. L. REV. 1103, 
1104–05 (1990); Joseph Trigilio & Tracy Casadio, Executing Those Who Do Not Kill: A 
Categorical Approach to Proportional Sentencing, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1371, 1399–1400 (2011). 
While few felony murderers who did not actually do the killing are sentenced to death, many non-
killers are convicted of murder under an accomplice or conspiracy theory and sentenced to death. 
Accordingly, the issues of death-eligibility in this Article present concerns that are both more 
common and less understood.   
 11. Not all cases in which the non-killer is sentenced to death will involve vicarious-
aggravator liability.  For example, an aggravating factor that applies whenever “the actor was under 
a sentence of life imprisonment or a sentence of death at the time of the commission of the 
homicide” would, apparently, apply directly to the non-killer defendant.  UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-
202(1)(p) (LexisNexis 2000) (repealed 2001). That is to say, a limited class of aggravating factors 
apply directly to the defendant, even though he is a non-killer, and do not require vicarious-
aggravator liability. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(5)(b) (2012) (“The defendant was 
previously convicted in this state of a [serious] felony”).   
 12. 481 U.S. 137, 150–58 (1987). 
 13. See infra text accompanying notes 166–67 (noting that the prosecution used killing for 
financial gain and killing in a cruel and heinous way as aggravating factors); see also Enmund, 399 
So. 2d at 1371–72 (noting that the trial judge relied on an aggravating factor specifying that “the 
capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel”); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 589 
(1978) (noting that the prosecution relied on an Ohio aggravating factor thatprovided “that the 
murder was ‘committed for the purpose of escaping detection. . .’”). None of these aggravating 
factors applies by their plain terms directly to the non-killer defendant.  
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scheme impose meaningful legislative limits on the ability of a prosecutor 
to pursue the death penalty.14 More specifically, if the only limit on the 
imposition of a death sentence is the benevolence, or arbitrariness, of the 
prosecutor, then that capital-sentencing system unconstitutionally fails to 
provide meaningful standards for imposing the death penalty.  
A vicariously imposed aggravating factor has the effect of imputing 
heightened culpability to a less culpable defendant, and capital-sentencing 
systems that permit such liability raise serious Eighth Amendment 
concerns.  The very purpose of aggravating factors—narrowing death-
eligibility to the very worst of all killers—is undermined when an 
aggravating factor is vicariously applied to a defendant. This Article thus 
concludes that blanket vicarious liability for aggravating factors is not 
constitutionally permissible.   
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides an overview of the 
limitations imposed by the Eighth Amendment in death penalty litigation. 
Specifically, this Part introduces both the procedural aspects of the Eighth 
Amendment—the use of aggravating and mitigating factors—as well as the 
substantive limitations—primarily the requirement of proportionality—
imposed by that Amendment.15 Part II provides a general description of 
common aggravating factors across the fifty states and the federal system 
and provides a basic overview of how aggravating factors function in death 
penalty litigation more generally. Next, in Part III, this Article summarizes 
the law of vicarious liability, providing a taxonomy of the various theories 
under which one defendant can be held liable for the actions of another. 
Finally, Part IV considers how the theories of vicarious liability, if applied 
mechanically to common aggravating factors, would create Eighth 
Amendment concerns.  
Ultimately, this Article concludes that the rote application of vicarious 
liability principles in the capital-sentencing context is constitutionally 
impermissible. Although the Eighth Amendment has not been read to 
preclude a non-killer from receiving a sentence of death, it does bar the 
imposition of the ultimate penalty when the defendant does not evince 
personal culpability sufficient to justify a finding of one or more of the 
statutorily enumerated aggravating factors. Specifically, this Article 
proposes a novel four-step procedure for assessing whether a non-killer can 
be made death-eligible under the Eighth Amendment.  
                                                                                                                     
 14. Zant, 462 U.S. at 877–78 & 877 n.15; Steven F. Shatz & Nina Rivkind, The California 
Death Penalty Scheme: Requiem for Furman?, 72 N.Y.U.  L. REV. 1283, 1290–91 (1997). 
 15. It might seem odd to divide the Eighth Amendment’s dual limits on capital sentencing 
schemes into substantive and procedural limitations, but the Supreme Court has recognized such a 
distinction. See, e.g., Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 606 (2002) (suggesting that aggravating 
factors are procedural limits); id. at 614 (Breyer, J., concurring) (agreeing); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 
U.S. 302, 329–30, 335–36 (1989) (suggesting that cases have, as a substantive matter, prohibited 
the imposition of the death penalty on certain classes of defendants on the grounds of 
proportionality). 
6
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I.  THE EIGHT AMENDMENT AND THE DEATH PENALTY 
A.  Procedural Limits: The Constitutional Function of Aggravating 
Factors 
 The prominent role that aggravating factors play in the imposition of 
capital punishment today is largely a historical and constitutional accident. 
There is nothing in either the plain text of the Eighth Amendment16 or its 
history17 that suggests, much less compels, a system of guided discretion 
predicated on the use of statutorily enumerated aggravating factors.18 Only 
through a slow process of procedural accretion did the American death 
penalty become almost inexplicably linked to the concept of aggravating 
factors. While a full history of the American death penalty is beyond the 
scope of this Article,19 in order to appreciate the Eighth Amendment 
problems intrinsic to vicarious liability for aggravating factors, a brief 
overview of this history is necessary.  
 From colonial times all the way through 1971, the death penalty was 
deemed substantially beyond the purview of the Eighth Amendment, if not 
beyond the purview of the Constitution itself. The Fifth Amendment 
explicitly refers to the death penalty,20 and for much of American history it 
was taken for granted that the states were free to impose the penalty in a 
method of their choosing. Moreover, the death penalty was the mandatory 
punishment at common law for all who were convicted of murder and of 
many other serious felonies.21 This approach quickly received a “negative 
                                                                                                                     
 16. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines 
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”). 
 17. See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Aggravating and Mitigating Factors: The Paradox of 
Today’s Arbitrary and Mandatory Capital Punishment Scheme, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 345, 
349 (1998) [hereinafter Aggravating and Mitigating Factors] (“In 1791, when the Eighth 
Amendment was adopted, all of the states followed the common law practice of making death the 
mandatory sentence for certain offenses.”). 
 18. The phrase “guided discretion” is used to indicate a capital-sentencing system in which 
the sentencer’s ability to impose death is limited, or guided through a set of statutory procedures.  
See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206–07 (1976) (affirming a death sentence based on a 
bifurcated trial and sentencing when the sentencer’s discretion was guided through the use of 
enumerated factors); David Hesseltine, Comment, The Evolution of the Capital Punishment 
Jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court and the Impact of Tuilaepa v. California on That 
Evolution, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 593, 597 (1995) (“Under a guided discretion statute, aggravating 
factors perform a constitutionally essential function in that the sentencing authority is required to 
find at least one aggravating factor present in a case before the death penalty is even an option.”). 
 19. Other scholars have admirably covered this topic. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. BOWERS, LEGAL 
HOMICIDE: DEATH AS PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA, 1864–1982 (1984); James S. Liebman, Slow 
Dancing with Death: The Supreme Court and Capital Punishment, 1963–2006, 107 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1 (2007). 
 20. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person . . . shall be deprived of life . . . without due process 
of law.”). 
 21. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 198 (1971) (“The growth of the law continued in 
this country, where there was rebellion against the [common law] rule imposing a mandatory death 
7
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verdict” from the colonies; as early as 1794, Pennsylvania divided its 
murder statute into degrees, reserving the automatic death penalty for 
murders of the first degree.22 Other states quickly followed suit; today, 
nearly every state uses degrees of murder as the first slice at determining 
which murderers should live and which should die.23  
Yet this division of murder into degrees was merely a legislative choice, 
made out of concern that juries—faced with a difficult choice between 
acquittal and death—would choose not to convict factually guilty 
defendants. For most of the death penalty’s history in this country, the 
United States Supreme Court largely stayed out of the states’ decision 
making regarding questions of life and death. In particular, it was long 
accepted that there was no principled, statutory way of distinguishing 
between those deserving of death and those who were less culpable. 
Indeed, the hallmark of this era—from colonial times through the early 
1970s—was the belief that it was the utmost in human hubris to imagine 
that life or death decisions could be reduced to a set of rules. Most 
famously, in 1971’s McGautha v. California decision, the Supreme Court 
explained that “[t]o identify before the fact those characteristics of criminal 
homicides and their perpetrators which call for the death penalty, and to 
express these characteristics in language which can be fairly understood 
and applied by the sentencing authority, appear to be tasks which are 
beyond present human ability.”24 Or as Justice William Brennan lamented 
in his McGautha dissent, the capital sentencing framework in every 
jurisdiction during this era was “purposely constructed to allow the 
maximum possible variation from one case to the next.” 25 Justice Brennan 
found it inconsistent with the constitutional mandate of fair procedures that 
there was nothing in the sentencing statutes that prevented a particular 
death sentence from “reflecting [a] merely random or arbitrary choice.”26  
 Justice Brennan’s call for a more rational and structured sentencing 
process would not go unheeded for long. The era of pure discretion, 
emphatically punctuated by McGautha, ended just one year later. In 1972, 
                                                                                                                     
sentence on all convicted murderers.”). 
 22. See, e.g., Frank Brenner, The Impulsive Murder and the Degree Device, 22 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 274, 274 (1953) (“The first statute to divide the crime of murder into degrees, enacted in 
Pennsylvania in 1794, was soon followed by like legislation in thirty-seven states and the District of 
Columbia, so that today murder grading in the United States is a device [that] has about it the aura 
of inertia associated with a matter, for better or worse, long settled.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 23. See Liebman, supra note 19, at 23, 27 (noting that mandatory death sentencing was 
subject to “history’s negative verdict” on the practice); Aggravating and Mitigating Factors, supra 
note 17, at 350 (noting that the accepted history is that “Tennessee, during the 1837–38 legislative 
session, became the first state to give juries sentencing discretion in capital cases once they found a 
defendant guilty of murder” and other states and the federal government followed suit shortly 
thereafter). 
 24. 402 U.S. at 204.  
 25. Id. at 248 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 26. Id. 
8
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a fractured Court held in Furman v. Georgia that the era of unguided 
discretion in capital sentencing was over.27 Furman’s practical impact was 
to strike down as unconstitutional the discretionary capital-sentencing 
systems that were the norm in every state that permitted executions.28 As 
Professor James Liebman has explained: 
From McGautha forward, the Court had assumed there were 
only three types of capital sentencing—mandatory, legally 
guided, and discretionary. McGautha ruled out the first two 
sentencing options—mandatory given history's negative 
verdict and legally guided because it could not be humanly 
realized. Though Furman may have done nothing else, it 
clearly ruled out the remaining discretionary method.29  
Furman, then, requires that death penalty decisions not be left to the 
arbitrary discretion of a jury. Instead, it requires meaningful procedural 
mechanisms for identifying the worst crimes and the worst offenders, 
reserving capital punishment only for the most deserving. Such a 
momentous shift has aptly been described as the modern “Big Bang” of 
capital punishment law.30  
Contrary to the predictions of many lawyers and academics, however, 
Furman did not mark the end of the death penalty in the United States.31 
As the Court itself would later recognize: 
Furman held only that, in order to minimize the risk that the 
death penalty would be imposed on a capriciously selected 
group of offenders, the decision to impose it had to be guided 
by standards so that the sentencing authority would focus on 
the particularized circumstances of the crime and the 
defendant.32  
 
                                                                                                                     
 27. Although Furman was a plurality decision, there was a paragraph-long per curiam 
holding that concluded that the death sentences imposed “in these cases” violated the Eighth 
Amendment. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1971); see also Corinna Barrett Lain, 
Furman Fundamentals, 82 WASH. L. REV. 1, 9 (2007) (“Before Furman was decided in 1972, the 
Eighth Amendment’s ‘cruel and unusual punishments’ clause was largely a dead letter in 
constitutional law.”).   
 28. See, e.g., John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Unusual”: The Eighth 
Amendment as a Bar to Cruel Innovation, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1739, 1753 n.78 (2008) (describing 
Furman as “striking down all then-extant state death penalty laws”). 
 29. See Liebman, supra note 19, at 27 (footnotes omitted). 
 30. Sundby, supra note 1, at 1152. 
 31. See, e.g., Austin Sarat, Recapturing the Spirit of Furman: The American Bar Association 
and the New Abolitionist Politics, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 5 (1998) (describing 
contemporaneous beliefs that Furman was heralding the death of capital punishment in the United 
States as “quite naïve as well as somewhat forlorn”). 
 32. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199 (1976). 
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Searching for a politically viable, constitutional alternative to the purely 
discretionary sentencing that preceded Furman, many states turned to the 
Model Penal Code’s (MPC) provisions on capital punishment.33 Just prior 
to the Furman decision, the American Law Institute published the MPC, 
which included provisions for a model capital-sentencing system that 
attempted to develop a more structured approach to determining whether 
death was the appropriate punishment in any given case. One scholar has 
summarized the rise of the MPC provisions as states attempted to guide the 
jury’s discretion as required by the post-Furman Eighth Amendment: 
The new statutes fell into two basic categories. A number of 
states sought to eliminate sentencing discretion altogether by 
making the death penalty mandatory for certain offenses. 
Many other states adopted an alternative approach patterned 
in varying degrees on the death penalty provisions of the 
Model Penal Code.  
In a series of 1976 decisions, the Supreme Court struck down 
mandatory death penalty provisions but upheld the statutes 
based upon the Model Penal Code. As a result of these 
decisions, all death penalty regimes now effectively follow 
the basic structure of the Model Penal Code.34 
In 1976, the Supreme Court upheld Georgia’s new MPC-based statute 
in Gregg v. Georgia, while invalidating in Woodson v. North Carolina the 
mandatory death sentencing regime that North Carolina had put in place 
after Furman.35 Later decisions made clear that a death penalty regime 
could not be mandatory even for a very narrow group of defendants. For 
example, in Sumner v. Shuman, the Court held that a statute imposing a 
mandatory death penalty when a prison inmate is convicted of murder 
while serving a life sentence without possibility of parole violates the 
                                                                                                                     
 33. See, e.g., MPC § 210.6 (Proposed Official Draft May 4, 1962) (repealed 2009) (“The 
Court, in exercising its discretion as to sentence, and the jury, in determining upon its verdict, shall 
take into account the aggravating and mitigating circumstances enumerated in Subsections (3) and 
(4) and any other facts that it deems relevant, but it shall not impose or recommend sentence of 
death unless it finds one of the aggravating circumstances enumerated in Subsection (3) and further 
finds that there are no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.”). 
 34. Tom Stacy, Changing Paradigms in the Law of Homicide, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1007, 1015–
16 (2001) (footnotes omitted).   
 35. Indeed, many constitutional scholars begin a discussion of the history of the death penalty 
with Furman and Gregg. See, e.g., Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: 
Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. 
REV. 355, 361–62 (1995). In reality, there were four decisions decided on the same day in 1976, 
three of which approved the less discretionary sentencing systems of states, and one that struck 
down mandatory death-penalty statutes as unconstitutional. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); 
Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Woodson v. North 
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976). 
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Eighth Amendment.36 Likewise, in Roberts v. Louisiana, the Supreme 
Court invalidated a mandatory death penalty for the killing of a police 
officer in the scope of her duties.37 The Court held that although in each 
case the state had created a very narrow class of aggravated murders that 
could fairly be called the worst of the worst, the state could not remove 
from the sentencer the opportunity to consider facts in mitigation of either 
the defendant or her crime.38   
So just as Furman eliminated the purely discretionary death penalty, 
Woodson and its line of cases eliminated the mandatory death penalty. Of 
the three types of sentencing regimes identified above by Professor 
Liebman—mandatory, legally guided, and discretionary—now only the 
middle one remained. And the principal method for guiding sentencing 
discretion—the procedure suggested by the MPC, adopted by most states, 
and approved by the Court—was the creation of a list of factors that, if 
proven, indicate that the murder was so egregious as to make the defendant 
eligible for a sentence of death.39 It is typically the function of statutorily 
enumerated aggravating factors, then, to distinguish the worst crimes and 
criminals from those that are somewhat less bad.40 Or as the Court 
explained in Zant v. Stephens, it is the aggravating circumstances that 
“perform[] the function of narrowing the category of persons convicted of 
murder who are eligible for the death penalty.”41 Death penalty 
retentionists believed that aggravating factors could provide the sort of 
“clear and objective standards” necessary to save the death penalty from 
                                                                                                                     
 36. 483 U.S. 66, 77–78 (1987). 
 37. 431 U.S. 633, 636–37 (1976) (“There is a special interest in affording protection to these 
public servants who regularly must risk their lives in order to guard the safety of other persons and 
property. But it is incorrect to suppose that no mitigating circumstances can exist when the victim is 
a police officer.”). 
 38. Sumner, 483 U.S. at 81 (“Past convictions of other criminal offenses can be considered as 
a valid aggravating factor in determining whether a defendant deserves to be sentenced to death for 
a later murder, but the inferences to be drawn concerning an inmate’s character and moral 
culpability may vary depending on the nature of the past offense.”); Roberts, 431 U.S. at 636 (“To 
be sure, the fact that the murder victim was a peace officer performing his regular duties may be 
regarded as an aggravating circumstance.”). 
 39. The MPC called for aggravating factors to be balanced against evidence in mitigation of 
the defendant’s crime. See supra note 33. In invalidating mandatory death sentences in Woodson 
and its line of cases, the Supreme Court has made the consideration of mitigating factors a 
necessary part of American capital punishment. See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 
280, 304–05 (1976). 
 40. Aggravating factors simultaneously serve to guide the discretion of the sentencer and give 
effect to the Eighth Amendment mandate that legislatures devise sentencing schemes that 
meaningfully distinguish murderers so as to create a narrow class of death-eligible defendants.  See, 
e.g., Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Casting a Wider Net: Another Decade of Legislative Expansion of the 
Death Penalty in the United States, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 6 (2006) (“A list of factors that make one 
eligible for the death penalty serves both (1) the role of giving guidance to juries and judges, and 
(2) the role of narrowing the group of murderers who are eligible for the death penalty.”). 
 41. 462 U.S. 862, 875 (1983). 
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unconstitutionality.42 To this day, the rule of Gregg—approving guided 
discretion based on statutorily enumerated aggravating factors—continues 
to be the principal means of determining who receives the death penalty. 
Aggravating factors thus function as the critical mechanism for ensuring 
that an otherwise death-eligible defendant43 is sentenced only through 
procedures that prevent the arbitrary imposition of the death penalty.44  
In sum, because of the development of the Court’s procedural Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence, the American death penalty is now inextricably 
linked to the use of aggravating factors.45 Aggravating factors, presented to 
the jury during the sentencing phase of a criminal trial, are the procedural 
mechanism through which our justice system distinguishes the worst of the 
worst.46 Sggravators function as a sort of rough proxy for the defendant’s 
moral culpability.47  
B.  Substantive Eighth Amendment Limits on the Imposition of the 
Death Penalty 
In addition to the myriad procedural rules that now govern the 
imposition of the death penalty,48 the Supreme Court has also enunciated a 
                                                                                                                     
 42. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 197–98 (1976); cf. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 
427 (1980) (striking down an aggravator because it failed to provide a “meaningful basis for 
distinguishing” death-eligible defendants) (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188). 
 43. For an eloquent elaboration on death ineligibility, see Lee Kovarsky, Death Ineligibility 
and Habeas Corpus, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 329, 346–56 (2010). 
 44. For purposes of this Article, we accept the aggravator–mitigator system as the means by 
which states achieve the constitutional mandate to meaningfully guide the discretion of the 
sentencer. To be sure, there is a well-founded critique of Gregg’s system of Eighth Amendment 
guided discretion as utterly failing to impose predictability and avoid arbitrariness. See, e.g., Joseph 
L. Hoffman, Where’s the Buck?—Juror Misperception of Sentencing Responsibility in Death 
Penalty Cases, 70 IND. L.J. 1137, 1159 (“Maybe Justice [John Marshall] Harlan was right all along 
in McGautha. Perhaps the best we can do in the death penalty area is to turn this intensely moral 
decision over to twelve good people and let them sweat blood over it. Perhaps our attempts to create 
‘rationality’ from within, by drafting lists of ‘aggravators’ and ‘mitigators,’ merely permit the jury 
to conclude that there is a legally ‘correct’ answer to the sentencing question.” (footnotes omitted)); 
Chelsea Creo Sharon, The “Most Deserving” of Death: The Narrowing Requirement and the 
Proliferation of Aggravating Factors in Capital Sentencing Statutes, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
223, 224 (2011) (arguing “that death penalty statutes with a litany of aggravating factors [do not 
meaningfully guide the sentencer’s discretion], rendering death eligible the vast majority of 
murderers, many of whom cannot be classified as the ‘worst’ offenders, and thus increasing the risk 
of arbitrary capital sentencing”). 
 45. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 878 (1983).   
 46. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 589 (2002) (holding that aggravating factors must be 
presented to the jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt). 
 47. For a lucid summary of the history of aggravating factors, see Kirchmeier, supra note 40, 
at 5–8 (citing Godfrey v. Georgia and explaining that “aggravating factors must give jurors clear 
standards for determining who receives the death penalty”). 
 48. See, e.g., Steiker & Steiker, supra note 35, at 372 (describing the post-Gregg process of 
judicial regulation in the realm of capital punishment).   
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substantive Eighth Amendment capital jurisprudence. Most significantly, 
the Court has held that the Eighth Amendment requires proportionality 
between the crime committed and the punishment imposed—that is, 
regardless of the procedures followed, the sentence imposed in a particular 
case cannot be disproportionate to the crime in fact committed. 49 Applying 
this proportionality requirement, over the last quarter-century the Supreme 
Court has rather systematically removed categories of crimes and criminals 
from the ranks of the death-eligible.50 Specifically, the Supreme Court has 
held that death is inappropriately disproportionate for a crime committed 
by a minor (Roper v. Simmons),51 for a crime committed by a mentally 
disabled individual (Atkins v. Virginia),52 and for a defendant who is 
incompetent at the time of the execution (Ford v. Wainwright).53 In each of 
these cases, the death penalty was deemed disproportionate—not to the 
offense committed, but to the status of the offender.54   
In other contexts, the Court has held that the death penalty is 
disproportionate to the crime committed, rather than with regard to an 
individual’s personal characteristics. For example, the death penalty was 
deemed disproportionate for the rape of an adult woman (Coker v. 
Georgia),55 and then later for the rape of a child (Kennedy v. Louisiana).56 
As the Court has explained, “capital punishment must be limited to those 
offenders who commit a narrow category of the most serious crimes and 
whose extreme culpability makes them the most deserving of execution.”57 
                                                                                                                     
 49. Professor Ian Farrell has explained that proportionality “is one of the most fundamental 
ingredients of our sense of just punishment”; according to Farrell, “Of the Justices who have 
occupied seats on the Court over the last century, only Justices [Antonin] Scalia and [Clarence] 
Thomas have maintained that the Eighth Amendment does not contain any requirement that [the] 
punishment be proportionate to the offense committed.” Ian P. Farrell, Gilbert & Sullivan and 
Scalia: Philosophy, Proportionality, and the Eighth Amendment, 55 VILL. L. REV. 321, 321, 322–
23 (2010). 
 50. See Kovarsky, supra note 43, at 350–56; see also John D. Castiglione, Qualitative and 
Quantitative Proportionality: A Specific Critique of Retributivism, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 71, 78–79 
(identifying two categories of proportionality review—“qualitative proportionality” and 
“quantitative proportionality”). 
 51. 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005). 
 52. 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002); see Markus Dirk Dubber, Toward a Constitutional Law of 
Crime and Punishment, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 509, 514 (2004) (describing Atkins as having “refocused 
doctrinal attention on the rich, and largely unexplored, substantive core of the Eighth Amendment’s 
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments”). 
 53. 477 U.S. 399, 401 (1986). 
 54. Charles S. Doskow, The Juvenile Death Penalty: The Beat Goes On, 24 J. JUV. L. 45, 55 
(2003-2004) (“If the details of crimes of the defendants in Penry, Stanford and Atkins are reviewed, 
it is hard to conclude that their perpetrators do not deserve the maximum sanction the law has to 
offer. Capital punishment is not disproportionate to the offense by that standard. Only the 
defendant’s status can render it disproportionate . . . .”). 
 55. 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977). 
 56. 554 U.S. 407, 421 (2008). 
 57. Id. at 420 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005)) (internal quotation 
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The Court’s cases lead ineluctably to the conclusion that a sentence of 
death is unconstitutionally disproportionate for crimes short of murder—
that is to say, the class of persons most deserving of death is a subset of 
those who are guilty of a murder.58 
Notably, however, the Court has also made clear that under its 
proportionality doctrine, not all persons guilty of murder are for that reason 
eligible for the death penalty. Taking the doctrine one critical step 
further—beyond limits on the status of the defendant and limits on the 
nature of the crime for which he is convicted—the Court, in a pair of cases, 
has provided guidance as to whether and under what circumstances those 
convicted of murder who did not themselves kill may be put to death. These 
two cases, Enmund v. Florida and Tison v. Arizona, stand for the 
proposition that some—but only some—non-killers may constitutionally 
be put to death for their crimes. As this Article elaborates, the collision of 
this question—when may non-killers be put to death?—with the 
predominance of aggravating factors in modern death penalty 
jurisprudence provides a platform for understanding the constitutionality of 
vicarious aggravating-factor liability. 
1.  Enmund v. Florida59 
While Earl Enmund waited for them nearby in a car, Samson and 
Janette Armstrong rang the doorbell of the victims’ rural home with the 
intention of robbing them.60 The robbery went awry, a gunfight ensued, 
and Samson Armstrong shot both victims.61 The Armstrongs then returned 
to the car, the three drove off and were subsequently apprehended, and 
both Enmund and Samson Armstrong62 were sentenced to death for their 
role in the robbery and killings.63 
On appeal, Enmund argued that because he did not take a life, attempt 
to take a life, or intend to take a life, he could not be sentenced to death 
consistent with the Eighth Amendment.64 The United States Supreme 
Court agreed.65 Analogizing to its recent decision in Coker that the death 
                                                                                                                     
marks omitted). 
 58. Actually, the Court limits the death penalty to those who kill or “attempt to kill.” Id. at 
421 (“[A] death sentence for one who raped but did not kill a child, and who did not intend to assist 
another in killing the child, is unconstitutional . . . .”); id. at 435 (noting that the crime at issue 
caused the victim “prolonged physical and mental suffering” but still holding that the death penalty 
was disproportionate). 
 59. 458 U.S. 782 (1982). 
 60. Id. at 784. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Janette Armstrong was tried separately and sentenced to three life terms. Id. at n.1. 
 63. Enmund was convicted of both robbery and murder under a felony murder theory. Id. at 
785. 
 64. Id. at 787. 
 65. Id. at 788. 
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sentence was disproportionate for the rape of an adult woman, the Court 
noted that Florida was in a distinct minority of states that permitted a death 
sentence to be imposed on felony murderers without any showing of 
additional participation in the felony or killing.66 However, the Court noted 
that it could not be swayed entirely by the views of the several states and 
that its obligation was to reach its own conclusions regarding the 
appropriateness of death in these circumstances.67 The Court summarized 
its conclusion on this point as follows: 
For purposes of imposing the death penalty, Enmund’s 
criminal culpability must be limited to his participation in the 
robbery, and his punishment must be tailored to his personal 
responsibility and moral guilt. Putting Enmund to death to 
avenge two killings that he did not commit and had no 
intention of committing or causing does not measurably 
contribute to the retributive end of ensuring that the criminal 
gets his just deserts. This is the judgment of most of the 
legislatures that have recently addressed the matter, and we 
have no reason to disagree with that judgment for purposes of 
construing and applying the Eighth Amendment.68 
2.  Tison v. Arizona69 
Enmund was decided by a narrow 5–4 vote.70 Only five years later, the 
Court reconsidered Enmund in Tison v. Arizona, deciding by a similar 5–4 
that the death penalty could be imposed upon Ricky and Raymond Tison 
despite the fact that the Tisons, like Earl Enmund, neither killed, attempted 
to kill, nor intended to kill the victims in their case. The grisly facts of the 
Tisons’ case were set forth by the Court in some detail. The two brothers 
broke their father and another convicted murderer out of prison by 
smuggling a small arsenal of deadly weapons into the jail in an ice chest.71 
In the ensuing escape, the senior Tison and the other escapee kidnapped 
and ultimately killed a family of four.72 While opinions differed regarding 
the role the Tison brothers played in the killings, it seems clear that they 
                                                                                                                     
 66. Id. at 789–91. 
 67. Id. at 797. 
 68. Id. at 801. It is worth noting that there is language in the Enmund decision that might 
fairly be read as permitting a sentence of death for a felony murder accomplice based on 
recklessness. See State Death Sentence, supra note 10, at 850–51 (parsing the language of Enmund 
and concluding that it was ambiguous as to whether death was reserved for those accomplices who 
intended for the victim to die); id. at 851–52 (“[T]he Court further muddled the opinion by failing 
to define the key concept of ‘intent to kill.’”). 
 69. 481 U.S. 137 (1987). 
 70. Enmund, 554 U.S. at 783. 
 71. Tison, 481 U.S. at 139. 
 72. Id. at 141. 
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neither killed themselves nor assisted in the killing itself.73 The brothers 
were nonetheless tried separately; convicted of robbery, kidnapping, and 
murder (under a theory of felony murder); and sentenced to death.74  
On appeal, the Supreme Court considered whether its decision five 
years earlier in Enmund foreclosed the imposition of the Tisons’ death 
penalty.75 The Court held that its Enmund decision stood simply for the 
proposition that the death penalty was impermissibly disproportionate 
punishment for the crime of felony murder simpliciter.76 Earl Enmund was 
a minor participant in a robbery and had no proven mens rea with regard to 
the killing engaged in by his confederates.77 By contrast, the Tison brothers 
were significant participants in both the jailbreak and the kidnapping;78 
they were also present at the killings (or at least very close by) and did 
nothing to stop them.79 Perhaps most important for the Court, the brothers, 
unlike Enmund, had a culpable mental state with regard to death.80 By 
breaking two convicted murderers out of prison, arming them, and 
assisting in their kidnapping of four innocent victims, both brothers 
demonstrated a level of mental culpability that the Court charitably 
described as recklessness; the brothers were aware of a grave risk that their 
conduct would cause death and proceeded with it nonetheless.81 As the 
Court wrote: 
A critical facet of the individualized determination of 
culpability required in capital cases is the mental state with 
which the defendant commits the crime. Deeply ingrained in 
our legal tradition is the idea that the more purposeful is the 
criminal conduct, the more serious is the offense, and, 
therefore, the more severely it ought to be punished.82 
3.  Summary 
Although at first blush inconsistent, Enmund and Tison both remain the 
law of the land today. While the language the Court used in Enmund—that 
the death penalty cannot be imposed on one who does not kill, attempt to 
kill, or intend to kill—would seem to preclude a death sentence for the 
Tison brothers, the latter case limited the former to its facts. It is true that 
                                                                                                                     
 73. Id. at 138. 
 74. Id. at 141–43. 
 75. Id. at 145–46. It is worth noting that the killing in Tison occurred before the Court’s 
decision in Enmund. 
 76. Id. at 147. 
 77. Id. at 147, 149. 
 78. Id. at 139. 
 79. Id. at 141. 
 80. Id. at 151. 
 81. Id. at 151–52. 
 82. Id. at 156. 
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those, like Earl Enmund, who do not have a culpable mental state with 
regard to death cannot be put to death. But it is also true that non-killers 
like the Tison brothers who are both significantly83 involved in the events 
leading up to the killing and who have a culpable mental state with regard 
to death may be executed without running afoul of the Eighth 
Amendment’s proportionality principle.  
 Some commentators have attempted to reconcile Enmund and Tison by 
emphasizing that Enmund was not present when the killing occurred.84  To 
be sure, when a defendant is merely a “minor actor” and he is “not on the 
scene,” the death penalty will oftentimes be indefensibly disproportionate. 
But the reason the Eighth Amendment is offended in such circumstances 
relates to individual culpability and not simply to the defendant’s location 
at the time of the killing.85 Specifically, in distinguishing the facts of Tison 
from those of Enmund, the Court emphasized the importance of mens rea 
in measuring the culpability of the individual.86 And clearly, mens rea 
suffuses the criminal law. At least since the promulgation of the MPC—
but really for hundreds of years before that in less explicit ways—mens rea 
has been the primary measure of individual culpability.87 In Part III, below, 
                                                                                                                     
 83. As to whether the distinction between minor and major participants makes any 
constitutional difference, Richard Rosen has explained that nearly “any participant” can be labeled a 
major participant. Rosen, supra note 10, at 1154 (“Major and minor just describe two indefinite 
areas on a continuum of participation . . . .”). 
 84. See, e.g., State Death Sentence, supra note 10, at 874–75 (reasoning that, at least in the 
felony murder context, “[u]nless the sentencer is completely convinced that the defendant was 
present at the scene of the murders, the defendant is death ineligible”); id. at 876 (concluding that 
Enmund’s absence from the murder scene was the “card that trumped his status as a significant 
participant” and concluding that if Enmund had been present “the Court’s analysis would probably 
have been different”). Presumably, if there was murder liability under a complicity theory other than 
felony murder, one that required culpability on the part of the defendant, then Professor David 
McCord would not insist on a rigid presence requirement as a prerequisite for satisfying the Eighth 
Amendment proportionality requirements.   
 85. The Supreme Court, 1986 Term—Leading Cases, 101 HARV. L. REV. 119, 142 (1987) 
(“[F]actors such as major participation in the underlying felony or presence at the scene of the 
killing may illuminate the defendant’s mental state regarding the killing . . . .”). 
 86. Because Tison simply decided what it called the “intermediate case” where a defendant’s 
“participation is major and whose mental state is one of reckless indifference to the value of human 
life,” Tison, 481 U.S. at 152, it seems reasonable to conclude that a minor participant, like Enmund, 
who had an intent to kill would also be death-eligible. Thus, at least two classes of felony murder 
accomplices may be sentenced to death: (1) those who intended to kill, regardless of whether they 
played a minor role; and (2) those whose participation was major and whose mens rea was at least 
reckless. Of course, in many cases the only evidence of mens rea will be the extent of the 
defendant’s participation in the felony, thus causing the two inquiries to blur into one.  See State 
Death Sentence, supra note 10, at 882 (“[D]efendant’s ‘participation’ in the felony will usually be 
the primary evidence of his mental state with respect to the killing.”). 
 87. See, e.g., Darryl K. Brown, Federal Mens Rea Interpretation and the Limits of 
Culpability’s Relevance, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 110–11 (2012) (recognizing that central 
to the MPC is the notion that “[m]ens rea must attach to every normatively significant element of 
the offense as a means to measure culpability”). 
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we return to the question of mens rea and culpability, demonstrating that 
pure vicarious liability for aggravating factors fails to adequately take into 
account the individual culpability of a non-killer. 
C.  Synthesizing the Substantive and Procedural Eighth Amendment 
Limitations 
As a procedural matter, Furman ushered in an era of Eighth 
Amendment oversight that requires the states to create legislative standards 
that separate out the worst of the worst. For the last thirty-five years, the 
states have been required to create a meaningful system of guiding the 
discretion of the capital sentencer. As a substantive matter, the death 
penalty is not available in those cases where a death sentence would be 
disproportionate to either the defendant or his crime.88 Together, these 
rules impose significant limits on who can receive a death sentence.89 A 
death sentence that would otherwise be proportionate for a non-killer—
because he satisfies the Tison–Enmund requirements—is barred unless the 
prosecution can prove the presence of at least one aggravating factor.90 An 
under-examined question in this regard is the role that vicarious liability 
                                                                                                                     
 88. Commentators have recently argued that the death penalty for felony murder accomplices 
is always disproportionate. See Trigilio & Casadio, supra note 10, at 1371 (recognizing the 
resurgence of Court interest in categorical proportionality review under the Eighth Amendment); id. 
at 1400–01 (concluding that the evolving standards of decency have shifted such that only ten 
jurisdictions allow the death penalty in “adherence to Tison’s minimal requirements”). As the title 
of that article suggests, these commentators, at times, argue that the death penalty is 
disproportionate for all non-killers, at least if the non-killer did not intend to kill. However, arguing 
that those who “neither kill nor intend to kill should be ‘categorically’ exempted from” capital 
punishment proves too much. Id. at 1407 (footnote omitted). It is not the case that all death 
sentences for non-killers arise in the context of felony murder; there are plenty of death-eligible 
cases in which the defendant was an accomplice to a first-degree murder under a theory of gross, or 
extreme, recklessness. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-102 (West 2012) (first-degree 
murder). Indeed, Joseph Trigilio and Tracy Casadio are often more precise and recognize that their 
discussion is limited to “felony-murder accomplices who do not intend to kill.” Trigilio & Casadio, 
supra note 10, at 1408. In other words, concluding that death is disproportionate for felony murder 
does not compel the conclusion that death is disproportionate for all accomplice non-killers.  This 
Article accepts the constitutionality of the death penalty for non-killers in the abstract, but considers 
the procedural limits on such sentences.  
 89. Some courts seem to imply that the Enmund–Tison analysis resolves the question of 
vicarious-aggravator liability.  For example, in People v. Borrego, 774 P.2d 854 (Colo. 1989), the 
Colorado Supreme Court explained: “Since complicity is a theory that necessitates holding one 
person legally accountable for the behavior of another, a defendant’s constitutional rights are 
violated if the jury in a capital offense sentencing hearing is given a complicity instruction.” Id. at 
857 (citation omitted). Of course, even without a complicity instruction a non-killer could be 
charged under some aggravating factors. See infra Section IV.B.   
 90. Cf. Rosen, supra note 10, at 1165 (“Because a defendant does not fall into one of the rigid 
categories of defendants for whom the death penalty is proscribed does not mean either that the 
death sentence is proportionate or that the court has reviewed the defendant’s case for 
disproportionality. It merely means that the death sentence imposed in the particular case is not 
disproportionate for the particular reason embodied in the particular rule.”). 
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can play in the process of proving aggravators. That is, can vicarious 
liability both make the defendant guilty of a capital crime and 
simultaneously satisfy the aggravating factor requirement, making the 
defendant eligible for the death penalty? After examining several common 
aggravating factors, we turn to that very question. 
II.  COMMON EXAMPLES OF AGGRAVATING FACTORS 
In light of the Court’s explicit approval of the aggravating-factor model 
of guided discretion, not surprisingly, most states that have retained the 
death penalty have opted to use a capital system based on the use of 
aggravating factors. With only a few exceptions,91 state sentencing systems 
recognize that a defendant convicted of murder is eligible for a sentence of 
death if, and only if, the state is able to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
the existence of an aggravating factor. The sentencing procedures in 
Arizona are illustrative: 
At the aggravation phase, the trier of fact shall make a 
special finding on whether each alleged aggravating 
circumstance has been proven based on the evidence that was 
presented at the trial or at the aggravation phase. If the trier of 
fact is a jury, a unanimous verdict is required to find that the 
aggravating circumstance has been proven. . . . If the trier of 
fact unanimously finds no aggravating circumstances, the 
court shall then determine whether to impose a sentence of 
life or natural life on the defendant. . . . . 
The penalty phase shall be held immediately after the trier 
of fact finds at the aggravation phase that one or more of the 
aggravating circumstances . . . have been proven. . . .  
At the penalty phase, the defendant and the state may 
present any evidence that is relevant to the determination of 
whether there is mitigation that is sufficiently substantial to 
call for leniency. In order for the trier of fact to make this 
determination, . . . the state may present any evidence that 
demonstrates that the defendant should not be shown 
leniency . . . . 
The trier of fact shall determine unanimously whether 
death is the appropriate sentence.92 
                                                                                                                     
 91. Most notably, Texas does not use a true aggravating-circumstance system. Instead, the 
Texas system, approved by the Supreme Court in Jurek, asks the jury to answer three questions and 
only if the answer to all three is yes is death permitted.  Rosen, supra note 10, at 1123 n.53; cf. id. 
at 1123 (noting that states do not have to follow the aggravating-factor approach to narrowing and 
explaining that some “states have chosen instead to narrow the class of [death-eligible] defendants 
by providing restrictive definitions of [first-degree] or capital murder.”).  i 
 92. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-752 (E)–(H) (2012). 
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Similarly, the Colorado capital statute provides that the jury shall not 
render a verdict of death unless it unanimously finds and specifies in 
writing that: “(A) At least one aggravating factor has been proved; and 
(B) There are insufficient mitigating factors to outweigh the aggravating 
factor or factors that were proved.”93  
Georgia’s system is slightly different in that it provides the sentencing 
jury with more discretion as to the ultimate sentencing decision.94 When 
the Georgia capital statute was challenged in 1983, the U.S. Supreme Court 
certified a question to the Georgia Supreme Court asking it to explain the 
role that aggravating factors play in the ultimate selection of a life or death 
sentence. Notably, the state Supreme Court responded that once at least 
one aggravating circumstance is proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the 
existence or nonexistence of one or more aggravating factors played no 
particular role in determining the sentence.95 Instead, once an aggravating 
factor is found to exist, the narrowing required by Furman is complete and 
the Georgia statute leaves to the “unfettered discretion of the jury” the 
question of whether the defendant lives or dies.96 Although this procedure 
struck many as an admission that the Georgia statute resembled a 
McGautha-Era, open-ended, discretionary statute, the United States 
Supreme Court held in Zant that the statute passed constitutional muster. 
The common denominator in all of these systems, despite their 
significant differences, is the use of the aggravating factor as the means of 
narrowing the class of death-eligible defendants.97 It is the aggravating- 
factor analysis that determines whether “the character of the individual and 
the circumstances of the crime” justify the imposition of a death 
sentence.98 The remainder of this Part serves to introduce some of the most 
common aggravating factors—that is, to provide examples of the sort of 
statutorily enumerated facts that suffice for Eighth Amendment purposes to 
make one eligible for the ultimate punishment. There are two general types 
of aggravators: (1) facts relating to the nature of the murder, or the 
defendant’s motivation for the murder; and (2) facts relating to either the 
                                                                                                                     
 93. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1.3-1201(2)(b)(II)(A)–(B) (West 2012). 
 94. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-31 (West 2012).   
 95. Georgia, because of its approach to capital sentencing, is referred to as a non-weighing 
state. Non-weighing in this sense means that the sentence is not limited to merely weighing the 
aggravating factors against the mitigating factors; instead, the ultimate sentencing decision is more 
open-ended and less structured.  See, e.g., Justin Marceau & Sam Kamin, The Facts About Ring v. 
Arizona and the Jury’s Role in Capital Sentencing, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 529, 576 (2011) 
(“Georgia’s statute, which was the subject of both the Furman and Gregg decisions, is a 
paradigmatic example of a non-weighing statute.”). 
 96. Id. at 576–77 (discussing Zant and Georgia’s capital-sentencing system).   
 97. See State Death Sentence, supra note 10, at 846 (recognizing that in order to give 
meaning to the requirement that death-eligibility be “limited to murders that can, by some rational 
criterion, be deemed ‘worse’ than most” states must enact procedural mechanisms for this purpose, 
and most have done so by “specifying ‘aggravating circumstances’”).  
 98. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 878–79 (1983). 
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victim’s or the defendant’s status at the time of the murder.99   
This Article does not attempt to generate a complete list of all 
aggravating factors across all capital-sentencing schemes; instead, this 
Article’s hope is to provide a representative sample of some of the most 
common and frequently relied upon aggravating factors.100  
A.  Aggravating Factors Relating to the Murder Itself 
1.  Cruel and Heinous Killings 
Many scholars have observed that one of the most ubiquitous 
aggravating factors is the statutory factor allowing a defendant to be 
deemed death-eligible if the crime was committed “in an especially 
heinous, cruel, or depraved manner.”101 An illustrative example of this sort 
                                                                                                                     
 99. Obviously there are a number of plausible ways to categorize the range of aggravating 
factors.  One scholar has catalogued every aggravating factor in every state with capital punishment, 
and he has further subdivided the aggravating factors such that he concludes there are four 
categories. According to Professor Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier:  
First, there are factors that determine [death-eligibility] based upon specific facts 
surrounding the murder. Second, some factors focus on the defendant’s motivation 
in committing the murder. Third, some factors focus on the defendant’s status at 
the time of the murder. Fourth, some factors focus on the status of the victim.   
Kirchmeier, supra note 40, at 17–18 (footnotes omitted). 
 100. For a comprehensive list of the aggravating factors used across all jurisdictions, see 
Aggravating and Mitigating Factors, supra note 17, at 400–30 (compiling a list of forty-five 
different aggravating circumstances that were in use throughout all capital sentencing systems as of 
1998). It should be noted that in addition to the statutory aggravators, as required for death-
eligibility, a number of jurisdictions—all non-weighing jurisdictions—allow the sentencer to assess 
non-statutory aggravating factors when determining the ultimate question of life or death. In other 
words, although non-statutory aggravators do not serve the narrowing function essential to this 
Article, they do play a role in all non-weighing jurisdictions in determining whether a defendant 
will live or die. See, e.g., Donald M. Houser, Reconciling Ring v. Arizona with the Current 
Structure of the Federal Capital Murder Trial: The Case for Trifurcation, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
349, 354–55 (2007) (“Unlike statutory aggravating factors, which must be established for the 
defendant to be eligible for the death penalty, [non-statutory] aggravating factors are neither 
sufficient nor necessary for the jury to sentence the defendant to death. Only if the jury has first 
found the existence of at least one intent factor and one statutory aggravating factor does a [non-
statutory] aggravating factor become relevant to the jury’s determination of whether to impose the 
death penalty.” (footnotes omitted)); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3593(e) (2006) (requiring at least one 
statutory aggravating factor to be found before the defendant is deemed eligible for death, and 
permitting the jury to balance mitigation against statutory and non-statutory aggravating factors); 
U.S. v. McCullah, 76 F.3d 1087, 1106–07 (10th Cir. 1996) (“The Supreme Court has dealt with the 
issue of non-statutory aggravating factors in state capital punishment statutes and has held the use 
of non-statutory aggravating factors permissible.”); Adam Thurschwell, After Ring, 15 FED. SENT’G. 
REP. 97, 101 (2002) (“In the technical parlance of the Supreme Court’s capital jurisprudence, 
statutory aggravators serve to ‘narrow’ the class of convicted murderers to those ‘eligible’ for 
execution, while [non-statutory] aggravators enter in the sentencing calculus only at the ‘selection’ 
stage . . . .”). 
 101. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(5)(j) (2012). Cruel-and-heinous aggravators, although 
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of statutory-eligibility factor is contained in California’s capital-sentencing 
provisions, which isolate as eligible for death those defendants where the 
murders involved are “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, manifesting 
exceptional depravity.”102 Even the state of Virginia, which recognizes 
only two death-qualifying factors, regards a killing that was “outrageously 
or wantonly vile” as sufficing for death-eligibility.103 Notably, there is a 
split in jurisdictions regarding the wording of this aggravating factor that 
has not attracted judicial or academic attention. Specifically, whereas 
statutes like California’s dictates only that the murder was “especially 
heinous, atrocious, or cruel,”104 other jurisdictions seem to specify that the 
defendant himself must have acted with the requisite cruelty. For instance, 
the Connecticut statute provides that “[t]he defendant committed the 
offense in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner.”105 While these 
variations in language are more likely a product of chance or caprice than 
reasoned legislative judgments, as this Article will show, these subtle 
variations play a powerful role in the vicarious application of the atrocious, 
heinous, and cruel aggravator. 
2.  Pecuniary Gain 
Another common aggravating factor pertaining to the crime relates to a 
pecuniary motive for the killing.106 An example is Florida’s capital-
sentencing statute, which allows for death-eligibility if “[t]he capital felony 
was committed for pecuniary gain.”107 The Florida statute, then, is focused 
                                                                                                                     
commonplace, are very controversial. On multiple occasions the Supreme Court has cautioned 
against overly vague and amorphous aggravators. See, e.g., Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 653 
(1990); Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 363 (1988); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 429 
(1980). Nevertheless, imprecise aggravators of this form persist. See, e.g., Richard A. Rosen, The 
“Especially Heinous” Aggravating Circumstance in Capital Cases—The Standardless Standard, 
64 N.C. L. REV. 941, 944 (1986).  
 102. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(14) (West 2012). For a list of all the cruel and heinous 
aggravators used by states, see Aggravating and Mitigating Factors, supra note 17, at 400 n.348.   
 103. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.2 (2012). 
 104. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(14) (West 2012).   
 105. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-46a(i)(4) (2012). For a statute that seems to combine both 
approaches to the aggravator, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(e)(1)(l) (2012) (“The murder was 
outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, 
use of an explosive device or poison or the defendant used such means on the victim prior to 
murdering the victim.”). This statute contains both language describing the crime—“the murder was 
outrageously or wantonly vile”—and describing the participation of the defendant: “[T]he 
defendant used such means on the victim prior to murdering the victim.” Id. (emphasis added). 
 106. Professor Kirchmeier counted more than thirty-two states that use some version of this 
aggravating factor as of 1998. Aggravating and Mitigating Factors, supra note 17, at 410 n.367 
(compiling all the state statutes). 
 107. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5)(f) (2012).  The Colorado statute is nearly identical, providing 
that the murder “was committed for pecuniary gain.” COLO. REV. STAT.§ 18-1.3-1201(5)(h) (Lexis 
2012).   
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on the motive of the killing alone, and not on who did the killing.108 By 
contrast, statutes in other jurisdictions focus both on the motive for the 
killing and the fact that the defendant himself, acting as principal, 
committed the murder. For example, the federal death-penalty statute 
specifies that “[t]he defendant committed the offense as consideration for 
the receipt, or in the expectation of the receipt, of anything of pecuniary 
value.”109 The interpretations of these statutes seem to be in agreement that 
the pecuniary-gain aggravator applies whenever the defendant commits the 
murder in order to obtain any property of value110—that is, the aggravator 
applies not just to murders for hire, but to murders done in order to obtain 
anything of pecuniary value.111  
3.  Felony Murder 
 Another common aggravating circumstance is that a death occurred 
during, or in flight, from certain enumerated felonies. As with other 
aggravating factors, there is variation among the jurisdictions with regard 
to the required participation of a particular individual. For instance, some 
states, such as Colorado, specify that the defendant himself must have 
“intentionally caused the death of a person” during the course of the felony 
in order for the aggravator to apply to him.112 That is to say, Colorado’s 
statute raises questions of both mens rea and of causation; not only must 
                                                                                                                     
 108. Id. 
 109. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)(8) (2006). 
 110. Seemingly every jurisdiction that has interpreted the pecuniary-gain aggravating factor 
has held that the possibility of a financial reward must have been the motive for the murder itself 
and that robbery must not have been a mere afterthought. 
 111. Courts in many jurisdictions have held, for example, that the aggravator applies where the 
defendant committed the murder in order to steal a car.  See Schad v. Ryan, 671 F.3d 708, 725 (9th 
Cir. 2011) (holding that, under Arizona law, where there was evidence that Defendant used the 
victim’s vehicle and credit cards within a day of the murder, the evidence “rationally supported the 
application of the [pecuniary-gain] aggravating factor”); Thessing v. State, 230 S.W.3d 526, 539 
(Ark. 2006) (holding that the pecuniary-gain aggravator had been proven where Defendant stole the 
victim’s car and other personal possessions after committing the murder; and the fact that the State 
failed to introduce evidence that Defendant’s motive had been formed prior to the murder, or 
evidence regarding the value of the stolen items, was immaterial); Porter v. State, 429 So. 2d 293, 
296 (Fla. 1983) (holding that, where the State proved that Defendant “took his victims’ automobile, 
television, silverware, jewelry, and other items,” the pecuniary-gain aggravator had been proven; 
and the fact that Defendant subsequently threw the stolen property away without profiting from it 
was immaterial). 
 112. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(5)(g) (2012) (“[I]n the course of or in furtherance of 
such or immediate flight therefrom, the defendant intentionally caused the death of a person other 
than one of the participants . . . .”); IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9(b)(1) (2007) (“The defendant committed 
the murder by intentionally killing the victim while committing or attempting to commit [a 
felony].”). The Colorado statute specifies a separate aggravator for the killing of a person during a 
kidnapping. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(5)(d) (2012) (“The defendant intentionally killed a 
person kidnapped or being held as a hostage by the defendant or by anyone associated with the 
defendant.”). 
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the defendant have caused the death himself, he must have done so with a 
culpable mental state—in this case, purpose. By contrast, other 
jurisdictions recognize the existence of the aggravator whenever the 
“death, or injury resulting in death, occurred during the commission or 
attempted commission of, or during the immediate flight from the 
commission of,” certain enumerated felonies.113 In contrast to a Colorado 
defendant, a defendant in such a state is made death-eligible whenever a 
death occurs during the commission of a felony in which the defendant is 
involved; it need be shown neither that the defendant killed nor that he had 
any mens rea with regard to the death of the victim. Such legislative 
distinctions, even if likely inadvertent, must be given effect. Although all 
felony murder aggravators focus on deaths that occur in the course of a 
felony, they are very different in the sweep of their coverage. 
4.  Grave Risk of Death to Others 
 Another aggravating factor, and one that is often present, is that the 
murder of one person put others at risk of death or injury. Illustrative is the 
Utah Code, which provides that an aggravating factor exists whenever the 
“actor knowingly created a great risk of death to a person other than the 
victim . . . .”114 Many public shootings or other acts of violence in crowded 
areas will satisfy this aggravator. But again, there is a question whether this 
aggravating factor can, as a matter of statutory construction, apply to a 
non-killer who is guilty of murder. Does the defendant satisfy this 
aggravating factor by creating a risk of death to others even if he does not 
actually kill the victim?  
 Consider an example. Imagine two co-felons, A and B, both of whom 
shoot at V and V’s friends from a passing car. Assume that A strikes and 
kills V but that B misses all of the intended victims. A, obviously, is liable 
for premeditated murder and has satisfied the grave risk of death 
aggravator; he is thus clearly eligible for a sentence of death. But what 
about B, his co-felon? B is likely liable for the killing itself under either an 
aiding-and-abetting or coconspirator theory—B emboldened A’s homicidal 
acts and intended to do so; there was an agreement between A and B 
inferable from their conduct and the killing of V was committed in 
furtherance of that agreement. Furthermore, B satisfies the Enmund–Tison 
                                                                                                                     
 113. 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)(1) (2006); see also ALA. CODE § 13A-5-49(4) (2012) (“The capital 
offense was committed while the defendant was engaged or was an accomplice in the commission 
of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing, or attempting to commit, rape, robbery, 
burglary or kidnapping.”); FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5)(d) (2012); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(5)(d) 
(2012) (“The capital offense was committed while the defendant was engaged, or was an 
accomplice, in the commission of [a felony.]”); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-303(2) (2011) (“The 
offense was aggravated kidnapping that resulted in the death of the victim or the death by direct 
action of the defendant of a person who rescued or attempted to rescue the victim.”). 
 114. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202(1)(c) (West 2012).   
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prerequisites for the death penalty—he was present and actively 
participating in the felony, had major participation in it, and shared A’s 
homicidal intent. The only barrier to the imposition of a death sentence 
upon B, therefore, is whether the grave risk of death to others aggravating 
factor is proven with regard to him. There are two ways to conceive of B’s 
culpability with regard to this aggravator: First, B may satisfy the 
aggravating factor through his own conduct. That is, it may be sufficient to 
show that he created a grave risk of death himself and that the aggravating 
factor is thus satisfied even though he himself did not kill.115 The other is 
to hold B liable for the factor vicariously; because he is guilty of the crime 
and because the principal killed while creating a grave risk of death to 
others, the factor is satisfied with regard to B as well. Whether either of 
these theories will satisfy the aggravating factor will depend on two things: 
the wording of the aggravating factor and the constitutionality of vicarious 
liability for aggravating factors.  
B.  Aggravating Factors Relating to the Status of the Defendant or the 
Victim 
1.  The Status of the Defendant 
One of the most common aggravating factors based on the status of the 
defendant is the fact that the defendant has been convicted of a prior 
violent felony. Many jurisdictions have an aggravator that applies 
whenever the defendant has previously been convicted of a serious violent 
felony.116 The federal death penalty in fact has three distinct prior-
conviction aggravators: (1) “Previous conviction of violent felony 
involving firearm;”117 (2) “[p]revious conviction of offense for which a 
sentence of death or life imprisonment was authorized;”118 and (3) the 
“defendant has previously been convicted of 2 or more Federal or State 
offenses, punishable by a term of imprisonment of more than 1 year.”119 
Relatedly, many jurisdictions treat the fact of one’s incarceration at the 
                                                                                                                     
 115. For example, under Colorado’s statute, applying the aggravating factor to B would require 
a finding that B created a grave risk of death to others in the commission of the offense. COLO. REV. 
STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(5)(i) (“In the commission of the offense, the defendant knowingly created a 
grave risk of death to another person in addition to the victim of the offense.”) (emphasis added). 
Was the “commission of the offense” the shooting of the victim by A or, conceived more broadly, 
did the “commission of the offense” include B’s firing into the passing vehicle with an intent to 
kill?   
 116. The Colorado statute specifies that any prior conviction for a “class 1 or 2 felony 
involving violence” suffices to make a defendant eligible for the death penalty. COLO. REV. STAT. 
§ 18-1.3-1201(5)(b) (2012). 
 117. 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)(2) (2006). 
 118. Id. at § 3592(c)(3). 
 119. Id. at § 3592(c)(4). Arizona’s capital-sentencing statute also appears to recognize three 
classes of prior-conviction aggravating factors. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-751(F)(1), (2), (8) 
(2012). 
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time of the murder as an aggravating factor—in those jurisdictions, anyone 
who commits a first-degree murder in a prison is death-eligible.120 For both 
of the aggravating factors just listed, the plain statutory language generally 
emphasizes the fact that the defendant who is convicted of first-degree 
murder must have a qualifying prior conviction; there is no reference to or 
discussion of vicarious liability.121 One could imagine a case, however, in 
which the actual killer does not personally satisfy any of the aggravating 
factors but his accomplice does. For example, if B encourages and assists 
A in shooting a random stranger, it is possible that no aggravating factors 
will apply to A. However, if B has a prior conviction or is currently 
incarcerated, it is plausible that B (the non-killer) is death-eligible and A 
(the killer) is not. Alternatively, if the aggravating factor applies 
vicariously, yet another odd result is conceivable. Imagine that B—who 
neither has a criminal record nor is incarcerated—helps A to commit a 
murder within a prison. If the “already serving a prison sentence” 
aggravator can be vicariously applied, then B is rendered death-eligible by 
virtue of A’s current incarceration.122  
2.  The Status of the Victim 
Most capital-sentencing statutes provide for one or more aggravating 
factors based on the victim’s status—that is, some attendant circumstance 
relating to the status of the victim determines the severity of the crime. 
Common examples include killing a “peace officer,” “firefighter,” “judge,” 
or “elected . . . official.”123 Alternatively, the defendant may face a 
sentence of death when he kills a particularly vulnerable victim, such as a 
youthful,124 elderly,125 pregnant,126 or disabled victim.127 Interestingly, 
there is once again a material distinction in the way these vulnerable-victim 
statutes are worded. A Wyoming aggravator relating to age, for example, 
provides that the aggravator exists if the “[t]he defendant knew or 
                                                                                                                     
 120. Either by case law or statutory text, incarceration includes actual incarceration as well as 
parole. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-751(F)(7)(a) (defendant committed the offense while 
“[i]n the custody of or on authorized or unauthorized release from the state department of 
corrections, a law enforcement agency or a county or city jail . . . [or] [o]n probation for a felony 
offense”).   
 121. Id. 
 122. Similar reasoning could apply to aggravating factors that apply when the possession of the 
murder weapon is a felony. If A has a prior conviction and thus the possession of a gun is a felony, 
the question is whether B, as A’s accomplice to murder, is vicariously liable for the felon-in-
possession aggravator.   
 123. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(5)(c) (2012). 
 124. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3b(4)(k) (West 2012) (“The victim was less than 14 
years old.”). 
 125. See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-102(h)(ix) (2012). 
 126. See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(d)(17) (2012). 
 127. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(i)(14) (2012). 
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reasonably should have known the victim was . . . older than sixty-
five . . . years of age.”128 Obviously, the defendant must be guilty of first-
degree murder in order to be death-eligible. If he is guilty of first-degree 
murder, then this vulnerable-victim aggravator appears to apply regardless 
of whether he was the actual killer. By contrast, a Colorado aggravating 
factor applies only if the “defendant intentionally killed a child who has 
not yet attained twelve years of age.”129 Under Colorado law, this factor 
requires not only that the defendant himself be the killer, but that he have 
some mens rea with regard to the victim’s status. A defendant who kills 
intentionally but is unaware or even reckless with regard to the child’s age 
cannot satisfy this statute in Colorado; similarly, a defendant who intends 
that a child die and helps another to kill a child may not be death-eligible 
because he is not himself the child’s killer. 
C.  Summary 
In this brief and admittedly inexhaustive survey of common 
aggravating factors, this Article’s goal has been to demonstrate that from 
the non-killer’s perspective much depends on the precise nature of the 
legislature’s wording. By their terms, some of these factors can be applied 
only to killers, some can be applied to anyone guilty of a murder, and 
others are ambiguous. Similarly, some aggravating factors require mens 
rea, while others appear to countenance strict liability. This patchwork of 
statutes should not be overly surprising, given the multiplicity of death-
penalty states and the fact that capital statutes—and particularly 
aggravating factors—are often quickly, haphazardly, and serially drafted. 
This variation in the wording and apparent meaning of aggravating factors 
does raise important questions, however, about whether there are 
constitutional limits on the capacity of a state legislature to apply these 
factors against non-killers. After examining the doctrines of vicarious 
liability in more detail, this Article will synthesize its various 
components—the Eighth Amendment’s limits on the imposition of the 
death penalty, the use of aggravating factors to do this work, and the 
doctrines of vicarious liability—to suggest important limits on the 
vicarious application of aggravating factors. 
III.  DOCTRINES OF VICARIOUS LIABILITY 
Setting aside for a moment the question of death-eligibility, criminal 
law recognizes several different theories of vicarious liability. That is, as a 
matter of substantive criminal law, there are various theories under which 
                                                                                                                     
 128. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-102(h)(ix) (2012). 
 129. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(5)(m) (2012). If A holds the victim while B shoots him, 
is A (as an accomplice to murder) eligible for death based on the youthfulness aggravator?  Should 
it matter that A didn’t know it was a child but B did?  Similar problems arise for aggravating factors 
relating to the victim’s status as a government officer or a pregnant woman.   
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criminal culpability for murder—or any other crime—may be attributed to 
a defendant who did not commit the prohibited acts herself. Long 
controversial, these doctrines take on an added level of controversy when 
they lead to a conviction for capital murder. 
A.  Accomplice Liability 
Perhaps the best known of the vicarious-liability doctrines is the 
concept of accomplice liability. Accomplice liability is an ancient idea: 
those who intentionally assist others in the commission of a crime are 
liable for that crime as accomplices.130 The common law had various terms 
to describe those who were involved in the commission of an offense—
principal, principal in the second degree, accomplice, accessory, accessory 
after the fact, and so on.131 Modern criminal law, by contrast, has greatly 
simplified accomplice law. It holds liable both those who in fact commit 
crimes (principals) and those who aid and intend to aid the commission of 
the offense (accomplices).132 The accomplice is generally deemed to be 
guilty of the principal’s crime as if she had done it herself—that is, we say 
that she is guilty of the principal’s crime as an accomplice.133 While her 
diminished role in the commission of the offense may be considered at 
sentencing, as a general matter accomplices share the guilt of those they 
abet.134 What is more, the common law requirement that the principal be 
convicted before an accomplice can be convicted of the offense has largely 
been abrogated;135 in fact, there exist today situations in which an 
                                                                                                                     
 130. See, e.g., Audrey Rogers, Accomplice Liability for Unintentional Crimes: Remaining 
Within the Constraints of Intent, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1351, 1353–54 (1998) (“From the earliest 
days of civilized society, aiding someone in the commission of a criminal act with the intent that a 
crime be committed has been deemed blameworthy and deserving of punishment.”). 
 131. SANFORD H. KADISH, ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 589–90 (8th ed. 2007). 
 132. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06 (Proposed Official Draft May 4, 1962). 
 133. See, e.g., Dressler, supra note 6, at 433.  It is not even necessary in many jurisdictions to 
identify who is the accomplice and who is the principal. See, e.g., 15 Colo. Prac., Criminal Practice 
& Procedure § 18.43 (“The complicitor and the principal need not be charged as codefendants in a 
single proceeding, but if they are, it is not necessary to designate which is the principal and which is 
the complicitor. In fact, a person can be charged as a principal and be convicted as a complicitor, or 
vice versa.”). 
 134. Cf. Joshua Dressler, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 91, 108-09 (1985) (“Neither modern nor ancient 
treatises adequately explain why accomplices are punished for crimes they did not perpetrate, or 
why their punishment may be as severe as that given to perpetrators. Although common moral 
intuition dictates that all willing participants in crime should be punished, it would require a leap of 
faith to derive from that intuition the thesis that all accomplices and perpetrators should be treated 
alike. Considering the importance of the concepts of personal liability and causation in criminal 
law, it is remarkable how little has been written on the theoretical basis of modern accomplice 
liability and punishment.”) 
 135. See, e.g., People v. Garcia, 52 P.3d 648, 655 (2002) (“If a shooter’s conviction is required 
to impose vicarious liability on an aider and abettor, this restriction may unduly thwart the 
prosecution of defendants involved in gang-related shootings. For instance, if the actual shooter 
were also killed during an exchange of gunfire (therefore making a conviction impossible), the aider 
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accomplice can be convicted even if the principal has a defense that 
precludes her conviction entirely.136 
Although the acceptance of accomplice liability is universal in the 
English-speaking world,137 its theoretical underpinnings remain relatively 
unexamined.138 Agency theory—the idea that the acts of an individual’s 
agents are attributable back to the individual—only goes so far in 
explaining the doctrine. As Professor Joshua Dressler has noted, the 
principal is not truly the accomplice’s agent.139 For example, it is possible 
to be an accomplice of a principal who is unaware that he has received the 
accomplice’s aid; by contrast, agency law requires that the agent accept the 
principal’s direction.140 Similarly, a harm-based approach cannot justify 
holding the accomplice liable for the crimes of the principal; accomplice 
liability does not rely on causation141 and could not reasonably do so. That 
                                                                                                                     
and abettor would escape liability . . . notwithstanding undisputed evidence that someone 
intentionally and personally discharged a firearm proximately causing death.”); MODEL PENAL CODE 
§ 2.06(7) (Proposed Official Draft May 4, 1962) (“An accomplice may be convicted on proof of the 
commission of the offense and of his complicity therein, though the person claimed to have 
committed the offense has not been prosecuted or convicted or has been convicted of a different 
offense or degree of offense or has an immunity to prosecution or conviction or has been 
acquitted.”); Lance R. Chism, Comment, Criminal Law—State v. Carson: A Misguided Attempt to 
Retain the Natural and Probable Consequences Doctrine of Accomplice Liability Under the 
Current Tennessee Code, 29 U. MEM. L. REV. 273, 275 (1998) (“The most significant limitation to 
convicting an accessory at common law was that the conviction of the principal was an ‘absolute 
prerequisite.’ . . . Today, almost all states . . . allow an accomplice to be convicted even if the 
principal has not been prosecuted or convicted, and also allow conviction of the accomplice if the 
principal has been acquitted or has been convicted of a different offense.”). 
 136. See, e.g., Sanford H. Kadish, Complicity, Cause and Blame: A Study in the Interpretation, 
73 CALIF. L. REV. 323, 327–28 (1985) (“A difficult question is what the legal status of the actions of 
the principal must be for the accomplice to incur liability. The obvious suggestion that the principal 
must be liable is shown to be incorrect by cases where the principal has a defense based upon 
policies extrinsic to his guilt (such as diplomatic immunity or entrapment), or where the 
principal’s behavior is excused. The guilt of the principal would suffice to ground the liability of 
the accomplice where the principal has a [policy-based] defense (extrinsic to his guilt) but will not 
suffice where the principal is excused.”). 
 137. See Dressler, supra note 5, at 91–92 (“The law of accomplice liability is perhaps now so 
widely accepted that few scholars have examined the soundness of its theoretical foundations.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 138. Robert Weisberg, Reappraising Complicity, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 217, 222 (2000) 
(“Since the advent of the [MPC], accomplice liability has received relatively scant attention.”); 
Michael D. Heyman, The Natural and Probable Consequences Doctrine: A Case Study in Failed 
Law Reform, 15 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 388, 389 (2010) (“Accomplice accountability is one of the 
most difficult topics to deal with properly, either pedagogically or through scholarly analysis. When 
people are part of multi-crime enterprises, it seems counterintuitive both for someone to be liable 
for the conduct of another and for her not to be.”). 
 139. See, e.g., Dressler, supra note 5, at 110 (“Civil rules of agency, however, cannot explain 
precisely the doctrines of [criminal-law] accountability. Civil agency requires a party to consent to 
being subjected to the control of another, whereas criminal liability does not.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 140. Id. 
 141. State v. Tally, 15 So. 722, 738 (1894) (“The assistance given, however, need not 
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is, short of a finding that an accomplice has compelled the principal to 
act—and duress is a very difficult case to make—it would be extremely 
difficult to demonstrate that the encouragement of the accomplice caused 
the principal to act.142 Thus, an accomplice may be convicted for the 
principal’s conduct even in those situations in which it is clear that the 
principal would have committed her crimes even without the aid and 
encouragement of the accomplice. The MPC has embodied this approach, 
holding a defendant liable not just for those crimes of the principal that she 
has aided and intended to aid, but also crimes that she intended to aid and 
attempted to aid.143 
The justification for accomplice liability, then, must lie in the 
manifestly antisocial behavior of the accomplice. That is, it must be based 
on the theory that one who encourages others to commit crimes and intends 
that those crimes be committed has demonstrated the same danger to 
society that the principal has in doing those crimes herself. Of course, to 
say that the behavior of the accomplice is antisocial and deserving of 
society’s condemnation is not the same as saying that that antisocial 
behavior is identical to that of the principal. Nonetheless, every American 
jurisdiction would treat the accomplice as guilty of the same offense as the 
principal; only by persuading the sentencer that the defendant–accomplice 
was materially less culpable does the criminal law allow the secondary 
actor to obtain a less severe sentence.144 
B.  Coconspirator Liability 
At its core, a conspiracy is a relatively simple idea—the crime is 
committed when two or more people agree to commit a crime or crimes 
and then any one of them takes an overt act in furtherance of the 
agreement.145 Conspiracy is a felony, punishable as such and often carrying 
                                                                                                                     
contribute to the criminal result in the sense that but for it the result would not have ensued.”); 
Dressler, supra note 137, at 99 (“Unlike the person who commits the crime, the accomplice need 
not be causally tied to the harm for which she is punished.”). 
 142. See, e.g., Kadish, supra note 136, at 327 (“Complicity emerges as a separate ground of 
liability because causation doctrine cannot in general satisfactorily deal with results that take the 
form of another’s voluntary action.”). A defendant who uses an innocent agent to commit a crime—
one who has no mens rea regarding the offense—is culpable not as an accomplice but as a 
principal. For example, where a defendant gets a “mule” to carry drugs across a border completely 
without the mule’s awareness, the defendant is liable for the smuggling as a principal and the 
innocent mule is not liable at all. Id. at 342 (“Since the acts of the primary party are excused and 
hence not fully volitional, they can be treated as caused by the actions of the secondary party.”). 
 143. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(3)(a)(ii) (Proposed Official Draft May 4, 1962) (“A 
person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of the offense if: with the purpose of 
promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense, he . . . aids or agrees or attempts to aid 
such other person in planning or committing it . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 144. See, e.g., United States v. Ambrose, 740 F.2d 505, 508–09 (7th Cir. 1984). 
 145. In some cases, particularly for more serious crimes, the overt-act requirement may be 
done away with. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03(5) (“No person may be convicted of 
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with it punishments that vary with the seriousness of the crime agreed to by 
the parties.146 Thus, for instance, conspiracy to commit murder is a felony, 
perhaps less serious than commission of the murder itself, but more serious 
than, say, conspiracy to commit bank robbery.147 Again, the MPC takes a 
relatively extreme position with regard to vicarious liability. Under the 
Code, conspiracy to commit a crime is itself a crime, and is generally 
punishable at the same grade of seriousness as the target offense itself. 
That is, under the Code, a conspiracy to commit a robbery is an offense of 
equal seriousness as the robbery itself.148 
In addition, and perhaps more importantly, conspiracy is also a theory 
of vicarious liability. The members of a conspiracy are generally 
responsible for the crimes committed by other members of the conspiracy 
if they are committed in furtherance of the conspiracy and are reasonably 
foreseeable.149 This is true regardless of whether the crimes committed 
were those agreed to as part of the conspiracy.150 Thus, where several 
people plan  a  bank robbery and thereafter one of the people robs the bank 
and kills a guard in the process, the other people are liable for the 
substantive offense of conspiracy to commit bank robbery; bank robbery 
(under a coconspirator theory); and murder (under a coconspirator theory), 
assuming that the killing was reasonably foreseeable.  
Thus, one can see that coconspirator liability is significantly broader 
than accomplice liability in those states that have adopted both theories of 
liability.151 This broadening of liability occurs in two ways. First, a 
                                                                                                                     
conspiracy to commit a crime, other than a felony of the first or second degree, unless an overt act 
in pursuance of such conspiracy is alleged and proved to have been done by him or by a person with 
whom he conspired.” (emphasis added)). 
 146. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1003(D) (2012) (“Conspiracy to commit a class 1 
felony is punishable by a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of release on any basis 
until the service of twenty-five years, otherwise, conspiracy is an offense of the same class as the 
most serious offense which is the object of or result of the conspiracy.”); CAL. PENAL CODE § 182 
(West 2012) (setting forth the punishments for conspiracies to commit various categories of crimes). 
 147. See supra note 146.  
 148. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.05(1) (Proposed Official Draft May 4, 1962) (“Except 
as otherwise provided in this Section, attempt, solicitation and conspiracy are crimes of the same 
grade and degree as the most serious offense that is attempted or solicited or is an object of the 
conspiracy. An attempt, solicitation or conspiracy to commit a [capital crime or a] felony of the first 
degree is a felony of the second degree.” (brackets in original)). 
 149. See, e.g., Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 647–48 (1946). 
 150. United States v. Alvarez, 755 F.2d 830, 851 (11th Cir. 1985) (“We find the individual 
culpability of [the defendants] sufficient to support their murder convictions under Pinkerton, 
despite the fact that the murder was not within the originally intended scope of the conspiracy. In 
addition, based on the same evidence, we conclude that the relationship between the three 
appellants and the murder was not so attenuated as to run afoul of the potential due process 
limitations on the Pinkerton doctrine.”). But see Alex Kreit, Vicarious Criminal Liability and the 
Constitutional Dimension of Pinkerton, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 585 (2008) (arguing that the two-part 
test associated with the Pinkerton decision was never designed by the Court to function as such). 
 151. Note that the MPC has rejected vicarious liability based on participation in a conspiracy; 
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coconspirator is liable for the crimes of another regardless whether she has 
actually facilitated the criminal acts of the principal. Imagine, for example, 
two car thieves, each of whom agrees with a third party to participate in a 
ring of auto thefts. The two thieves are aware of each other’s existence and 
the fact that they are part of a larger agreement with common goals, but 
they do not meet or in any other way interact. Under an accomplice theory, 
the thieves could not be held liable for each other’s crimes; it would be 
difficult to show either that they assisted one another or that they had the 
intent to do so. Under a theory of coconspirator liability, by contrast, guilt 
would be relatively easy to prove. Each has entered an agreement with 
others and has intended to do so. Because each is aware of the other’s 
existence, the crimes that each commits are reasonably foreseeable to the 
other and are in furtherance of the conspiracy’s goals.  
Second, it should be seen that the coconspirator is liable even for 
crimes that were not countenanced by the conspiracy itself. Thus, in the 
conspiracy to commit bank robbery described above, the coconspirators 
would be liable for the unplanned, un-agreed-to killing of the security 
guard so long as that killing was both in furtherance of the conspiracy’s 
goal (bank robbery) and reasonably foreseeable. Although none of the 
defendants could be charged with conspiracy to commit murder—because 
that is not what any of them agreed to—any conspirator could be charged 
with murder on a coconspirator theory. Unlike with accomplice liability, 
where the accomplice’s guilt is determined by those crimes he both 
encouraged and intended to encourage, with coconspirator liability the 
relevant question is one of foreseeability. This is obviously a great 
expansion of the scope of accessorial liability. 
This expanded accountability afforded by coconspirator liability 
appears to be grounded in the particular dangers associated with group 
criminality.152 A defendant acting on his own can do only so much harm. 
When he combines with others for the same purpose, though, the dangers 
he poses can be multiplied many times over. Criminal agreements also 
have the effect of emboldening criminal action—the criminal who has 
agreed with others to commit crimes is more likely to actually commit 
those crimes than the criminal merely musing over possible criminal 
                                                                                                                     
in these situations, the Code would make a defendant liable only where his participation in a 
conspiracy makes him liable as an aider or abetter. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(3)(a)(ii) 
(Proposed Official Draft May 4, 1962). 
 152. See, e.g., Neal Kumar Katyal, Danger in Numbers: Why It Makes Sense to Have Harsh 
Punishments for Conspiracy, LEGAL AFFAIRS, March/April 2003, at 44, 44 (“In a world full of crime 
committed by groups, from terrorists to bank robbers to drug gangs to mafia families, traditional 
conspiracy doctrine plays a vital role in making our society and communities safer. The doctrine 
deters some people from joining criminal enterprises in the first place. And when conspiracies are 
hatched, the law gives prosecutors leverage to ‘flip’ defendants and build cases out of their 
testimony.”). 
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conduct.153 
C.  The Natural and Probable Consequences Doctrine 
The apex of vicarious liability is a species of accomplice liability 
known as the natural and probable consequences (NPC) doctrine. Under 
the NPC doctrine, a defendant is liable not just for those crimes that she 
has aided and abetted but for all crimes that are the natural and probable 
consequences of the crimes in fact aided and abetted.154 Here, 
foreseeability is the only restraint on the defendant’s culpability. Once he 
has become an accomplice, a defendant is liable for any crime that follows 
predictably from the crime he aided and abetted. While courts have split on 
the wisdom of the NPC doctrine, those jurisdictions that have accepted it 
allow for criminal liability even in circumstances where there would not be 
coconspirator liability.  
D.  The Felony Murder Rule 
Although not strictly a theory of vicarious liability, felony murder plays 
an important part in modern death-penalty jurisprudence.155 The rule, in its 
simplest form, is that any death that occurs in the course of an enumerated 
felony is murder regardless of the defendant’s individual culpability with 
regard to death.156 Accordingly, the most direct effect of the felony murder 
                                                                                                                     
 153. What is more, the agency theory that seemed misplaced in the accomplice-liability context 
makes more theoretical sense here.  By its very nature, a conspiracy is a bilateral (or multilateral) 
agreement.  Each of the parties has joined into an agreement because they expect and hope that they 
will be benefitted thereby. It seems only fair in that context to hold the defendant responsible for the 
foreseeable consequences of the plan that he has made himself a part of. 
 154. See, e.g., People v. Luparello, 231 Cal. Rptr. 832, 846 (1986). 
 155. The doctrine also has some outspoken and thoughtful defenders. See, e.g., Guyora Binder, 
Making the Best of Felony Murder, 91 B.U. L. REV. 403 (2011) (examining the features of the 
felony murder doctrine that make it a palatable, even desirable, part of America’s criminal law).   
 156. See GUYORA BINDER, FELONY MURDER (2012) 97–98: 
Contemporary commentators continue to instruct lawyers and law students 
that England bequeathed America a sweeping default principle of strict liability for 
all deaths caused in all felonies. According to Wayne LaFave’s treatise, “[a]t one 
time the English common law felony-murder rule was that one who, in the 
commission or attempted commission of a felony, cause another’s death, was 
guilty of murder, without regard to the dangerous nature of the felony involved or 
the likelihood that death might result from the defendant’s manner of committing 
or attempting the felony.” Similarly the American Law Institute’s Model Penal 
Code commentary describes “the common-law felony-murder doctrine” as 
declaring “that one is guilty of murder if death results from conduct during the 
commission or attempted commission of any felony. . . . As thus conceived, the 
rule operated to impose liability for murder based on . . . strict liability.” 
According to Joshua Dressler’s textbook, “At common law, a person is guilty of 
murder if she kills another person during the commission or attempted 
commission of any felony. This . . . felony-murder rule applies whether a felon 
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rule is to permit a murder conviction for a principal who lacked the mens 
rea necessary for a murder conviction.157 Considering again the robbery 
situation above as an example, imagine the bank guard is killed 
accidentally in the course of the principal’s robbing of the bank. The death 
could be charged as murder, even if the principal was neither reckless nor 
even negligent in bringing about the guard’s death. This much-criticized158 
prosecutorial shortcut thus makes it much easier to prove a murder case 
against the principal than if the government were required to show that the 
defendant was extremely reckless with regard to death.  
But felony murder does more than simply make the principal 
responsible for a murder for which he might otherwise lack mens rea. 
Combined with other doctrines of vicarious liability, it makes the other 
participants in a felony equally guilty for an unintended killing committed 
by another. Thus, not only is the robber who accidentally killed in the 
course of his crime a murderer under a felony murder theory, but the 
accomplice who gave him the gun (and who is liable for the robbery under 
an accomplice theory) is now responsible for a crime he neither intended 
nor committed. Felony murder, then, is something like a vicarious liability 
theory on top of a vicarious liability theory. While the Enmund and Tison 
decisions ameliorate some of the worst consequences of this doctrine—by 
making those guilty of felony murder simpliciter ineligible for the death 
penalty—the fact remains that in many instances a non-killer who lacks a 
highly culpable mens rea with regard to death can be found guilty of 
                                                                                                                     
kills the victim intentionally, recklessly, negligently, or accidentally and 
unforeseeably.” Arnold Loewy’s Criminal Law in a Nutshell informs students that 
“[a]t early common law, felony murder was a simple proposition: any death 
resulting from an apparently non-dangerous felony would be murder.” (footnotes 
omitted). 
Note that Binder is skeptical of this reading:   
[N]one of these accounts identifies when this supposed common law rule of 
strict liability for all deaths resulting from felonies became the law in England. 
None identifies a single case in which it was applied in England before American 
independence.  These accounts are hazy about early American law. None of them 
documents application of such a rule in colonial America, or in the early American 
republic.  In short, there is something suspicious about our received account of the 
origins of American felony murder rules.” 
Id. at 98 (footnotes omitted).  
 157. There is a tension between the death penalty, which tends to require heightened 
procedures and culpability, and felony murder, which “in its starkest form, provides that any 
participant in a specified felony that results in death shall be punished as a murderer . . . .” See 
Rosen, supra note 10, at 1104–05. 
 158. See, e.g., James J. Tomkovicz, The Endurance of the Felony-Murder Rule: A Study of the 
Forces That Shape Our Criminal Law, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1429, 1441 (1994) (noting that the 
rule is inconsistent with basic requirements of culpability). 
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murder, and perhaps even capital murder.159 
IV.  PUTTING THE PIECES TOGETHER: PROPORTIONALITY AND VICARIOUS 
AGGRAVATORS 
A.  Alternative Approaches to Vicarious-Aggravator Liability 
For current purposes, this Article takes certain Supreme Court 
doctrines as fact. For example, this Article presumes that the death penalty 
can be constitutionally imposed given a statutory scheme that genuinely 
narrows the pool of death-eligible murderers. Further, this Article 
presumes that a defendant can be criminally prosecuted for the conduct of 
another under a theory of accomplice or coconspirator liability. Finally, 
this Article takes as a given the Court’s decisions in Tison and Enmund, 
which make some non-killers eligible for death. The specific question 
addressed here is whether a defendant who did not himself kill can be 
made eligible for death through vicarious aggravating-factor liability.160 In 
other words, can an aggravating factor be imputed to a defendant based on 
the actions or status of his codefendant? This is a question the Supreme 
Court itself has not yet addressed and that has proven enigmatic for the few 
lower courts that have even obliquely addressed the subject.161  
There are three conceivable approaches to vicarious-aggravator 
liability. First, a court could conclude that any imputation of aggravating 
factors from one defendant to another is strictly prohibited. This position is 
the equivalent of a holding that the Eighth Amendment requires each 
individual to have personal responsibility for any aggravating factor 
alleged against him. Alternatively, one could argue that any aggravating 
                                                                                                                     
 159. The majority of states, as a statutory matter, prohibit the death penalty for felony murder 
accomplices unless the defendant intended to kill. See Trigilio & Casadio, supra note 10, at 1401. 
 160. Analogously, this Article is interested in whether a killer who is not otherwise guilty of 
capital murder can be sentenced to death based on vicarious liability for the aggravating factors of 
an accomplice. The question, more generally, is whether aggravating factors may ever be applied 
across defendants.    
 161. Colorado’s state high court is emblematic. In the one opinion on the subject, the Colorado 
Supreme Court held that the United State Supreme Court’s Enmund opinion forbade the giving of a 
complicity instruction at sentencing. See People v. Borrego, 774 P.2d 854, 857 (1989). Because 
Enmund stands for the proposition that the focus at sentencing should be on each individual’s moral 
culpability, the Court reasoned, “[i]t is therefore impermissible under the eighth amendment to treat 
in the same manner two defendants facing a sentence of death so that the jury could attribute to one 
the culpability of the other. Since complicity is a theory that necessitates holding one person legally 
accountable for the behavior of another, a defendant’s constitutional rights are violated if the jury in 
a [capital] sentencing hearing is given a complicity instruction.” Id. (citations omitted). This is true 
so far as it goes, but it probably overstates the constitutional mandate. It is true that the focus at 
sentencing must be on the individual being sentenced and that a general complicity instruction at 
sentencing would invite the jury to impute the principal’s death worthiness to the accomplice. By 
contrast, if the court explains to the jury under what circumstances a particular aggravating factor 
may be found with regard to a non-killing defendant, this Article submits that the Eighth 
Amendment is satisfied. 
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factor that is applicable under a doctrine of vicarious liability ought to 
apply vicariously to each defendant. In other words, if an aggravating 
factor is directly applicable to a principal, and other defendants are 
responsible for the principal’s behavior under a theory of vicarious 
liability, then that aggravating factor should be imputed against each 
defendant. As explained more fully below, this Article submits that a third, 
middle-of-the-road position most closely approximates the Court’s current 
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. Before elaborating on this Article’s 
theory of vicarious liability, it is worth considering what vicarious-
aggravator liability would look like under the two extreme models that this 
Article rejects.  
 Consider first the view that there can be no vicarious-aggravator 
liability. Such a system would preclude death sentences for nearly all non-
killers. One state supreme court has come close to embracing this position, 
explaining that “a defendant’s constitutional rights are violated if the jury 
in a [capital] sentencing hearing is given a complicity instruction” as to an 
aggravating factor.162 While this holding certainly demonstrates concern 
about vicarious aggravating-factor liability, it is probably overreading it to 
conclude that an aggravating factor can never apply to a non-killer. That is 
to say, some aggravating factors may apply based on the plain text of the 
statute, and a defendant who has personally satisfied the requirements of 
the aggravator may be death-eligible. For instance, vicarious-aggravator 
liability hardly seems necessary to apply certain victim-specific 
aggravators to a non-killer. For example, imagine an aggravating factor 
that makes a defendant death-eligible if the victim of a murder is under the 
age of twelve. An aggravating factor like this—which describes a fact 
about the world that is either true or false—would seem to apply equally to 
killers and non-killers alike. 
A more extreme limitation on the death penalty would recognize the 
inapplicability of any aggravating factors to non-killers. That is to say, the 
most robust limitation on vicarious-aggravator liability would be an 
understanding that only the killer himself can be made death-eligible 
through the use of aggravating factors. Such a view, while laudably 
protective of the Eighth Amendment interest in limiting the death penalty 
to the very most culpable offenders, is necessarily in tension with the 
holdings of both Enmund and Tison, which recognized the possibility that a 
non-killer can be sentenced to death consistent with the Eighth 
Amendment.163 In Tison , for example, two of the aggravating factors that 
rendered the defendant eligible for death—committing a killing for 
pecuniary gain, and killing in a cruel and heinous manner164—were not 
                                                                                                                     
 162. Id. 
 163. See infra note 164 and accompanying text. 
 164. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 141–42 (1987) (citing the applicable version of the 
Arizona capital-sentencing statute).  In addition, although the death sentence in Enmund was struck 
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directly applicable to Tison because he was not the actual killer. In other 
words, the Court implicitly endorsed at least some level of vicarious 
aggravating-factor liability in Tison. Accordingly, a reading of the capital 
sentencing statutes that precludes any vicarious aggravator liability is 
necessarily a narrowing of the death penalty beyond what the Court itself 
has sanctioned.165  
At the other extreme is the concept of a full applicability of aggravating 
factors to non-killers. Some examples of broad application of aggravating 
factors are entirely palatable. For example, an eligibility factor that asks the 
sentencer to consider the future dangerousness of the defendant would, it 
seems, be as logically applicable to a non-killer as to the killer himself. 
Insofar as future dangerousness is an individualized assessment of the 
future threat he poses to society, it is relevant to the appropriate 
punishment in a given case, and there is good reason to apply this 
aggravating factor to a non-killer. Just as with true accomplice liability, 
which requires culpability on the part of the principal, the critical question 
is whether the defendant himself poses the level of dangerousness that 
makes him eligible for death.  
 However, other examples of the absolute approach to aggravator 
liability test the strictures of the Eight Amendment. In particular, once 
aggravating factors are applied vicariously to non-killers, the fit between 
the aggravating factor and the individual culpability of a non-killer 
becomes attenuated. For example, under the absolute view, if one is a 
coconspirator, then he can fairly be charged with any of the aggravating 
factors that followed from the conspiratorial plan and that were reasonably 
foreseeable. For example, if an aggravating factor specifies that the 
defendant killed someone for pecuniary gain, the application of that factor 
to one who killed for profit meaningfully impacts his culpability. 
Application to a non-killing coconspirator would be significantly more 
problematic, though. On these facts, the pecuniary-gain aggravator would 
apply to the codefendant only through a theory of accomplice or 
coconspirator liability.166 That is, although the text of the aggravator 
appears to countenance only application to those who kill, it could be 
argued that because a codefendant is responsible for the killing—as an 
accomplice or coconspirator—she is responsible for any relevant 
                                                                                                                     
down as disproportionate, the Court did not object to the State’s application of four aggravating 
factors to Enmund even though he was not the actual killer. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 785 
(“[T]he capital felony was committed while Enmund was engaged in or was an accomplice in the 
commission of an armed robbery; the capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain; it was 
especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel; and Enmund was previously convicted of a felony involving 
the use or threat of violence.” (citations omitted)). 
 165. Tison, 481 U.S. at 141–42. 
 166. The pecuniary-gain aggravating factor was applied to codefendant non-killers in both the 
Enmund and Tison cases. Tison, 481 U.S. at 142; Enmund, 458 U.S. at 785. 
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aggravators as well.167 
While this argument has some rationale to it, its application is deeply 
problematic. For example, consider a non-killer codefendant who assists in 
the killing of a juror or witness without knowing that the person the 
principal intends to kill is a juror or witness. Under a broad theory of 
vicarious aggravating-factor liability, the non-killer would be guilty of 
murder and could be charged with the witness-or-juror-killing aggravator.  
Even more extreme, if the killer has a prior violent felony (and the 
accomplice does not), under a theory of vicarious aggravating-factor 
liability, the non-killer could be charged with the prior-violent-felony 
aggravator since that factor is true with regard to the principal. Holding an 
accomplice liable for the aggravating factors that are unrelated to and even 
unknown to the accomplice would seem to undermine the very purpose 
aggravating factors are designed to play in the capital sentencing process—
designating an individual as the worst of the worst. If the factor that 
qualifies a defendant for death has no relation to the defendant’s own 
culpability, then the constitutionally assigned purpose of aggravating 
factors is simply not being served. The automatic and unthinking 
application of an aggravating factor to an accomplice or coconspirator thus 
violates the narrowing requirements of the Eighth Amendment. 
B.  The Eighth Amendment Solution to Vicarious-Aggravator Liability 
Because neither of these two extremes—no vicarious liability or total 
vicarious liability—reflects the Eighth Amendment mandate of 
individualized culpability assessments in capital sentencing, a novel 
alternative is needed. This Article proposes a straightforward, doctrinally 
grounded, four-part framework for resolving the question of vicarious-
aggravator liability.  
Borrowing from the Georgia Supreme Court’s Zant metaphor, this 
Article submits that the proper sentencing procedure can be thought of as a 
pyramid where only those defendants at the top of the pyramid can be 
sentenced to death on the basis of vicarious-aggravator liability.168 The 
pyramid consists of the following four tiers, each of which must be 
satisfied in order for a death sentence to be statutorily and constitutionally 
sound as to a non-killer: (1) the defendant must be guilty of first-degree 
                                                                                                                     
 167. After all, the entire vicarious-liability framework is predicated on this fictional notion that 
the defendant herself did something that she in fact did not. See Dressler, supra note 6, at 433 
(“[A]s an accomplice to murder she will be convicted of the offense of ‘killing’ another person 
when, in fact, she did not kill the victim; as an accomplice to a rape, she will be convicted of having 
sexual intercourse with one whom she did not (and perhaps could not) have had sexual relations; as 
an accomplice to burglary she will be convicted of breaking and entering a structure she may never 
have seen, much less broken or entered.”). 
 168. This Article, of course, borrows the image of the pyramid from the Georgia Supreme 
Court’s description of its capital-sentencing system. See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 870–71 
(1983). 
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murder; (2) the death penalty must be proportionate to the crime (and the 
defendant’s status); (3) the plain language of the capital-sentencing statute 
must permit the application of the aggravating factor to a non-killer; and 
(4) the defendant must have been at least reckless as to the aggravating 
factor’s existence. This Section elaborates on each of these four tiers in 
turn. 
The starting point for an analysis of the death-eligibility of a non-killer 
is, of course, the question of murder liability. If the defendant is not guilty 
of first-degree murder, then he cannot be sentenced to death. As discussed 
previously, there are a variety of doctrines that allow a defendant to derive 
liability from the conduct of his cohorts, and thus first-degree murder 
liability for a non-killer is not only possible, but common. The defendant 
need not be the actual killer, or the one who committed the offense, but he 
must be guilty of first-degree murder under one of the doctrines of 
vicarious liability.  
Second, even for a defendant guilty of first-degree murder, there can be 
no death sentence unless the substantive proportionality principle of the 
Eighth Amendment is satisfied. If the defendant is a juvenile, or he is 
mentally retarded, for example, then the death penalty is impermissible. 
Likewise, if the defendant is not a sufficiently major participant and he was 
not at least reckless as to the death of the victim, then a sentence of death is 
unconstitutionally disproportionate.   
Third, and perhaps most critically, is the requirement that the plain text 
of the aggravating factor permit vicarious liability. At this stage courts 
should defer entirely to the legislative will; courts ought not to consider the 
wisdom and overbreadth of the application of the aggravator to a non-
killer. In short, the question is purely one of legislative intent—that is, did 
the legislature intend for the aggravator in question to apply to a non-killer 
so as to render him eligible for the ultimate punishment. As is the case in 
other areas of law, the statutory text will not always be susceptible to a 
single, unequivocal meaning as to the extent of its vicarious applicability. 
Notably, this Article has identified at least four models of statutory 
language, the varying meanings of which determine whether vicarious-
aggravator liability might be permitted as a matter of statutory 
construction.  
In order to illustrate the four models of statutory language that are 
relevant to this question, it is useful to consider one of the aggravating 
factors that the prosecution relied on to seek the death penalty for Ricky 
and Raymond Tison. Recall that the Tisons were in the process of stealing 
a car to assist with a prison break when the eldest Tison shot and killed the 
family who was travelling in the car they sought to steal. Ricky Tison—
who was part of the jailbreak and robbery but did not commit the 
murders—was convicted of felony murder, and the prosecution sought the 
death penalty against him based on, among other aggravators, the 
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pecuniary-gain aggravating factor.169 Consider four variations on the 
pecuniary-gain aggravating factor and the implications of each for the 
vicarious application of that factor: 
(i) The defendant intentionally killed another person for 
pecuniary gain.  
(ii) The defendant committed the offense for pecuniary 
gain.170 
(iii) The defendant caused the death of another person for 
pecuniary gain. 
(iv) The murder was committed for pecuniary gain. 
From (i) to (iv), the aggravators are, arguably, worded from least to 
most amenable to vicarious application. Whether actual aggravators are 
carefully crafted with such care or whether the varying wording is simply a 
matter of chance, the plain text of the statutes must be given effect. 
Accordingly, an aggravator like example (i) should almost certainly not be 
read to permit vicarious liability. Where the aggravator is written so as to 
apply only when the “defendant kills,” it is a stretch to argue that this 
statute can be applied to a non-killer accomplice.171 In other words, we 
ought to respect the legislature’s decision to limit aggravating-factor 
culpability to individuals who actually kill.   
Example (ii), by contrast, is less straightforward. On the one hand, the 
phrase “committed the offense” in this statute seems synonymous with 
“kill.” Thus, there is a strong argument that this aggravator, like (i), should 
not be applied to a non-killer. On the other hand, the term “committed” 
might better be deemed equivalent to “is guilty of,” in which case 
application to a non-killer is appropriate. That is to say, one might read 
aggravating factors that limit their reach to defendants who “committed the 
offense” as permitting vicarious liability a long as the defendant is guilty of 
the murder under a theory of vicarious liability.172 While in our view this 
seems like a stretch, and although the issue has never been litigated in the 
                                                                                                                     
 169. Tison, 481 U.S. at 142. 
 170. This is the text of the pecuniary-gain aggravator that was in effect at the time of the 
Tisons’ prosecution. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-454(E) (1973) (“The defendant committed the 
offense as consideration for the receipt, or in expectation of the receipt, of anything of pecuniary 
value.”).   
 171. A typical example would be an aggravating factor that applies when “[t]he defendant 
intentionally killed a child . . . .” COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(5)(m). It would seem a stretch to 
say that the accomplice or coconspirator, who is guilty of murdering the child, actually killed the 
child.   
 172. It is strange to understand an accomplice as having “committed” an offense insofar as the 
defining feature of vicarious liability is holding one criminally responsible for a crime he did not 
commit. Dressler, supra note 6, at 433. 
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Supreme Court, it is worth noting that the pecuniary-gain aggravating 
factor that the prosecution relied on in Tison was worded in precisely this 
manner. Specifically, the relevant statute provided that the aggravating 
factor was satisfied if the “defendant committed the offense . . . in 
expectation of the receipt of anything of pecuniary value.”173 
Notwithstanding the statutory language appearing to limit liability to those 
who “committed the offense,” the Supreme Court upheld the death 
sentence based in part on the presence of this aggravating factor. A 
sentence of death was thus affirmed even though the aggravating factor 
was applied vicariously in a manner that appears inconsistent with the 
plain text of the statute. In our view, this was inconsistent with the plain 
language of the aggravating factor and, hence, error. 
Even more complicated is example (iii). That aggravating factor applies 
so long as the defendant caused death. Such statutes seem to evince the 
intent of the legislature to render eligible for death those defendants who 
did not actually kill or commit the offense but whose conduct foreseeably 
led to the death. But the difficult question with such a theory is what the 
State would have to prove in order to demonstrate that the defendant, as a 
non-killer, was the cause of a victim’s death. Significantly, there is a body 
of case law recognizing when defendants are the cause of death in such 
circumstances.174 Specifically, where the defendant creates a grave risk of 
death to others—that is, he manifests extreme malice to others—he may be 
treated as a cause in fact of the victim’s death, even though he was not the 
actual killer.175 Thus, when the aggravating factor specifies that there must 
be causation, then a defendant can plausibly be charged with an 
aggravating factor even if he did not himself commit the homicidal offense 
or kill the victim. 
Finally, example (iv) is the most straightforward example of vicarious-
aggravator applicability. In (iv), the aggravating factor is framed in terms 
of certain events, certain attendant circumstances external to any particular 
actor. For example, if the aggravating factor provides that the murder must 
have been committed for pecuniary gain, then as long as this circumstance 
exists the aggravator is satisfied with regard to all of those guilty of that 
killing. Similarly, if the aggravating factor specifies that the victim was 
under a certain age, or particularly vulnerable, or pregnant, then the 
aggravating factor can, as a statutory matter, logically be extended to any 
                                                                                                                     
 173. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-454(E) (1973). Notably, the Tisons were also rendered 
eligible for the death penalty under a cruel or heinous aggravating factor that applied only if the 
“defendant committed the offense in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner.” Id. Given 
that the Tison brothers did not kill anyone, had the parties litigated this issue, it seems that neither 
of these statutory aggravating factors would have applied to a defendant who was a non-killer—that 
is, a defendant who did not actually commit the offense. 
 174. See, e.g., People v. Gilbert, 408 P.2d 365, 373–74 (Cal. 1965).   
 175. See, e.g., id. 
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non-killer. There is nothing in the text of such aggravating factors that 
would preclude them from applying to a non-killer; indeed, the most 
reasonable reading of those statutes would suggest a legislative intent to 
apply the aggravator vicariously.176 
Fourth, assuming the defendant is guilty of first-degree murder under a 
theory of vicarious liability, assuming the death penalty is not 
disproportionate under the Eighth Amendment, and assuming finally that 
the plain text of the statute permits an aggravating factor to be applied to a 
non-killer, then the final question in our analysis is whether there is a 
constitutional problem with the vicarious application of that aggravator.  
In our view, the rote application of aggravating factors vicariously 
raises constitutional concerns unless there is a showing that the defendant 
has personal culpability with regard to that factor. Under a conspiracy, 
natural-and-probable-consequences, or felony murder theory of vicarious 
liability, a non-killer could be guilty of first-degree murder even if he was 
only negligent as to the resulting death.177 Moreover, the statute defining 
the relevant aggravating factor may permit liability for a non-killer, and it 
may even do so without specifying any additional mens rea.178 In our view, 
however, more is needed before a defendant can be rendered eligible for 
the death penalty. That is, even if the defendant can be guilty of murder 
based on a lower standard of mens rea, the Eighth Amendment requires 
that the defendant be at least reckless as to the aggravating factors relied 
upon to make him eligible for death.179  
Considering the constitutionally mandated function of aggravating 
factors in ensuring that only the most culpable offenders are eligible for 
                                                                                                                     
 176. One can imagine that if certain aggravating factors were worded so as to permit vicarious 
liability, the narrowing function that aggravating factors are designed to serve would be 
undermined. For example, if the conventional prior-conviction aggravator was phrased, “The killer 
had previously been convicted of a violent felony,” then a non-killer would be treated as eligible for 
a capital sentence based on a circumstance that had nothing to do with his own culpability.   
 177. These doctrines are sometimes described as theories of strict liability; however, given that 
the death under each doctrine must be reasonably foreseeable, it seems more apt to equate them 
with a culpability of criminal negligence.  
 178. Some aggravating factors specify a mens rea. For example, the aggravator might specify 
that during “the commission of the offense, the defendant knowingly created a grave risk of death to 
another person in addition to the victim . . . .” COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(5)(i) (2012). 
 179. Commentators have noted that as to the question of felony murder liability, the Enmund–
Tison limitation functions such that death is only available for those who were at least reckless as to 
the resulting death; this is a very feeble limitation. See Rosen, supra note 10, at 1158 (concluding 
that reckless indifference to life is present in nearly every felony murder).  However, with respect to 
the sort of attendant circumstances present in many aggravating-factor statutes—such as age, 
cruelty, etc.—the requirement of recklessness will likely prove to be a more meaningful 
constitutional limitation. Whereas the “Tison standard rationally can be held to apply to every 
felony murder accomplice,” id. at 1162, the same is not true for a recklessness requirement as to 
every material element specified in an aggravating factor. 
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death sentences,180 individual culpability for each aggravating factor is 
required. Specifically, where the aggravating factor does not itself specify a 
mens rea, the defendant can only be charged with the aggravator when the 
prosecution can prove to the jury that he was at least reckless as to the 
material elements of the aggravating factor. Accordingly, even if the 
aggravating factor specifies only that the victim was pregnant, or that the 
victim was an elected official, the non-killer cannot be held strictly liable 
for the aggravating factor. Even if strict aggravator liability may not be 
unconstitutional as applied to the actual killer, strict vicarious liability is 
simply too wide a net of death-eligibility when applied to the non-killer.181  
Thus, if A provides the murder weapon and other assistance to B, but 
has no idea that B’s intended victim is a minor, the narrowing function of 
the aggravating factors would be undermined if the minor-victim 
aggravator were imputed to A. On the other hand, because the Court has 
previously sanctioned the use of recklessness as the measure of culpability 
required to make death a proportionate punishment,182 we submit that the 
same level of culpability should suffice to satisfy the individual culpability 
requirements served by aggravating factors.183 Thus, B may still be found 
liable of murder under an aiding-and-abetting theory. And he may still 
satisfy the Eighth Amendment’s proportionality requirement if he was 
reckless with regard to the death of B’s victim. But he cannot be put to 
death unless it is also shown that he was also reckless with regard to the 
age of the victim. That is, unless he was aware of a risk that B planned to 
kill a minor and aided him despite this risk, he is not eligible for the 
penalty of death. 
In sum, vicarious-aggravator liability is constitutionally permissible, but 
strict vicarious-aggravator liability is not. In order to determine whether a 
non-killer may be sentenced to death, four distinct determinations should 
be made. While the first two requirements—first-degree-murder guilt and 
proportionality limits—are well-settled, our contribution is to emphasize 
the latter two conditions. Specifically, it is important to realize that not all 
aggravating factors are drafted in a way that permits, as a matter of 
statutory interpretation, vicarious liability. Moreover, even those 
aggravating factors that are textually amenable to vicarious liability would 
fail to satisfy the narrowing function ascribed to aggravating factors in 
Gregg if they were understood to impose strict vicarious liability. 
                                                                                                                     
 180. See generally Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (asserting that the death penalty is 
often applied arbitrarily). 
 181. Previous scholarship has recognized that the Court “conscripted the reckless indifference 
doctrine” into the Eighth Amendment inquiry for accomplice liability. See State Death Sentence, 
supra note 10, at 880–81 (internal quotation marks omitted) (criticizing the use of recklessness as 
insufficient as a narrowing device). 
 182. See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987). 
 183. See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3) (Proposed Official Draft May 4, 1962). 
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Accordingly, we propose a theory of vicarious-aggravator liability that 
permits a defendant to be charged with an aggravating factor only if the 
non-killer defendant is at least reckless as to the aggravating factor’s 
material elements.  
Obviously, if the aggravating factor specifies a higher level of 
culpability—intention or knowledge—then that is the mens rea that must 
be satisfied. When the aggravating factor is silent with regard to mens rea, 
however, the Eighth Amendment’s twin concerns of proportionality and 
narrowing are adequately safeguarded by requiring a culpability of at least 
recklessness.  
CONCLUSION 
A person may be convicted of murder even though he was not the 
actual killer; indeed, the doctrines of vicarious liability may permit such 
convictions even when the accomplice’s culpability is comparatively small. 
Moreover, the Supreme Court has not ruled out—and has in fact 
endorsed—the possibility of some non-killers being sentenced to death. 
However, as a procedural matter, the death-eligibility determination must 
still be based on criteria that genuinely narrow the class of death-eligible 
defendants. That is to say, even if the death penalty is not per se 
unconstitutional as applied to non-killers, it is clear that the ultimate 
punishment is only available if one or more of the aggravating factors 
applies to the non-killer. This Article considers this collision between 
vicarious liability and the narrowing function that aggravating factors are 
constitutionally mandated to provide.  
The Eighth Amendment’s proportionality doctrine limits the death 
penalty to defendants who had a culpability of at least recklessness as to 
the death of the victim. So too do the Eighth Amendment’s narrowing and 
proportionality doctrines require that a defendant be at least reckless as to 
the material elements of an aggravating factor in order to be eligible for a 
sentence of death. In order for the Eighth Amendment requirement that 
capital-sentencing systems sort out the worst of the worst to have any 
practical application, it must require not just the codification of 
aggravating factors, but also procedural rules for ensuring that non-killers 
are sufficiently culpable so as to justify the ultimate punishment. We can 
convict the defendant based on the bad luck that his coconspirator killed 
someone, and we can make him constitutionally death-eligible because he 
was reckless and deeply involved in the felony. But it is simply too much 
to take the third step of saying this defendant is the worst of the worst 
because his codefendant alone had culpability as to an aggravating factor. 
Stated more directly, it defies any sense of proportionality and narrowing 
to conclude that, based on the fact of involvement alone, regardless of the 
statutory text, and regardless of individual culpability, a defendant is guilty 
of not just murder, but capital murder.  
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